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execUtive sUMMary
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has requested that the Mineta 
Transportation Institute’s National Transportation Security Center of Excellence (MTI 
NTSCOE) provide any research it has or insights it can provide on the security risks created 
by the highway transportation of hazardous materials. This request was submitted to MTI 
NTSCOE as a National Transportation Security Center of Excellence. In response, MTI 
NTSCOE reviewed and revised research performed in 2007 and 2008 and assembled a 
small team of terrorism and emergency-response experts, led by Center Director Brian 
Michael Jenkins, to report on the risks of terrorists using highway shipments of flammable 
liquids (e.g., gasoline tankers) to cause casualties anywhere, and ways to reduce those 
risks. This report has been provided to DHS. 
The team’s first focus was on surface transportation targets, including highway infrastructure, 
and also public transportation stations. As a full understanding of these materials, and 
their use against various targets became revealed, the team shifted with urgency to the 
far more plentiful targets outside of surface transportation where people gather and can 
be killed or injured. However, the team is concerned to return to the top of the use of 
these materials against public transit stations and recommends it as a separate subject for 
urgent research. 
The following is a summary of key judgments:
The national threat level remains at yellow, indicating an “elevated” threat. Al  ●
Qaeda’s leaders and those inspired by its exhortations remain determined to carry 
out terrorist attacks on American targets abroad and in the United States.
The number of significant jihadist terrorist attacks, outside of Afghanistan and  ●
Iraq, declined in 2007 and 2008, and a greater number of terrorist plots have been 
uncovered and thwarted in the early stages. Terrorist plots uncovered in the United 
States since 9/11 have been characterized by local planning and low skill levels.
Al Qaeda-inspired terrorists, currently the most formidable terrorist threat, remain committed 
to large-scale bombings requiring vehicle-borne explosives.1 VBIEDs continue to be a 
preferred attack mode when high body counts and massive damage are the objectives. 
(Not all terrorist organizations seek high body counts. Environmentalist extremists, for 
example, seek spectacular property damage.)
The acquisition or manufacture of large quantities of explosives by terrorists is  ●
difficult, and it has been made more so by increased security and monitoring of 
ingredients such as ammonium nitrate fertilizer—a common ingredient in explosive 
devices when mixed with fuel oil.
Terrorists, notably in Iraq, have attempted to increase the lethality of their devices by  ●
adding propane tanks or toxic chemicals to them. Reports indicate that terrorists have 
also discussed substituting available hazardous materials for explosives, although 
it is not clear whether these discussions relate exclusively to the continuing conflict 
in Iraq. This possibility has also been mentioned in recent U.S. threat assessments. 
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Recent assessments also suggest that terrorists are considering how to weaponize 
gasoline tankers. 
While any specific type of terrorist attack against any specific category of target  ●
remains unpredictable, although of low statistical probability, the use of vehicles 
carrying hazardous-materials cargos as surrogate truck bombs must be considered 
a plausible mode of terrorist attack.
  
Although terrorists prefer truckloads of stolen or fabricated explosives, they could  ●
also turn trucks carrying flammable liquids, flammable gases, or toxic inhalants into 
weapons.
Spectacular accidents involving flammable liquids and gases and evacuations  ●
resulting from spilled loads of toxic inhalants provide inspiration. Reports of 
tanker thefts indicate vulnerabilities. These reports indicate that a terrorist thief or 
hijacker could count on many hours of driving—and perhaps days, if the truck were 
hidden—before being discovered. There would be ample time to get the tanker to 
the target.
Trucks carrying hazardous materials other than military or commercial explosives  ●
are ubiquitous and are less guarded than explosives shipments. They would appeal 
to terrorists with fewer resources—e.g., local conspiracies and lone operators—and 
especially to conspirators with insider knowledge or access to the industry.
The federal government focuses on consequences, devoting the greatest attention  ●
and finite resources—and therefore the most-stringent security mandates—to the 
transport of cargos capable of causing the greatest casualties. Terrorists, driven by 
operational constraints, might look at things very differently, focusing their efforts on 
the most readily available, least protected hazardous cargos—flammable liquids.
Gasoline tankers theoretically offer terrorists several operational attractions. They  ●
vastly outnumber all other hazardous-materials shipments combined. They operate 
in urban areas—target-rich environments. Their routes are predictable. They pose 
security challenges.
We therefore consider gasoline tankers and, to a lesser extent, propane tankers to  ●
be the most attractive options for terrorists seeking hazardous-materials cargos.
The principal threat from gasoline or propane tankers is fire. Without altering the  ●
tanker itself and adjusting its contents, it can be difficult to use a gasoline tanker to 
create an explosion; it is even more difficult to use a propane tanker. Creating an 
intense fire is far easier. The main limitation in creating an explosion using propane 
tankers is that vapors must be released to achieve exactly the right mixture of fuel 
and air and then ignited. Igniting propane is relatively easy, but causing propane to 
explode, especially at the right time and place, is technically difficult.
Forced to choose between undertaking a complex and demanding operation to  ●
cause massive death and destruction and executing a smaller-scale attack with 
certainty of success, terrorists seem generally to choose the latter. Terrorists may 
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be willing to sacrifice their lives; they are far less willing to risk operational failure.
Operational success tends to be defined in terms of casualties. Terrorists seek  ●
targets that have emotional or symbolic value—widely recognizable icons, targets 
whose destruction would significantly damage or disrupt the economy, and high 
body counts. In recent attacks, terrorists have been willing to forgo iconic value in 
favor of high body counts, for example, by bombing subways or commuter trains. 
The economic impact of such attacks is indirect.
For technical reasons, it is unlikely that terrorists planning to seize a truck loaded with  ●
hazardous materials or already possessing one would choose highway infrastructure 
as their primary target. These are difficult attacks to carry out, with relatively little 
gain. 
By contrast, people are the preferred soft target, as we have seen in terrorist attacks  ●
on public transportation systems, and terrorists have demonstrated their preference 
for attacking vulnerable public assemblies and residential properties. 
In that regard, additional research should be conducted on the use of these materials  ●
against public transportation stations where people congregate and from which they 
cannot easily escape to determine the extent to which both flammable liquids and 
gases, explosives, and even TIH materials might be used, and to determine what 
security measures could be adopted to mitigate these risks at these locations. MTI 
strongly recommends urgent research along these lines.
In the meantime, we recommend that the federal government, state governments,  ●
and industry collaborate to:        
Resolve significant jurisdictional issues between federal and state a. 
authorities 
Strengthen monitoring and enforcement of hazardous-materials security b. 
measures in the field; and
Work to implement vehicle tracking technologies, panic alarms, and c. 
immobilization capabilities for vehicles carrying large quantities of specific 
hazardous materials, including gasoline. These measures offer safety and 
anti-crime benefits as well.
Flammable liquids—particularly gasoline tankers—pose security threats that should  ●
not be minimized. These security threats are primarily to targets where large numbers 
of casualties can be created, and far less so to highway infrastructure. 
It is possible that the ●  government’s most recent threat assessments will alter current 
attitudes. But the authors urge a renewed look at flammable liquids and gases as a 
weapon of opportunity to create with relative ease an attack with enough certainty 
and enough causalities to make it a cause of national concern. 
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A strategy is needed urgently to strengthen and sustain security measures and  ●
technologies that can reduce the risks caused by highway-borne flammable liquids, 
and to a lesser extent, flammable gases, used against both non-transportation, and 
transportation targets.
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introdUction
Background
In 2008, building on research performed in 2007, the Mineta Transportation Institute’s 
National Transportation Security Center of Excellence assembled a small team of terrorism 
and emergency-response experts, led by Center Director Brian Michael Jenkins, to report 
on the risks of terrorists using highway shipments of flammable liquids (e.g., gasoline 
tankers) to cause casualties anywhere, and ways to reduce those risks.
The team’s first focus was on surface transportation targets, including highway infrastructure, 
and also public transportation stations. As a full understanding of these materials, and 
their use against various targets became revealed, the team shifted with urgency to the 
far more plentiful targets outside of surface transportation where people gather and can 
be killed or injured. However, the team is concerned to return to the top of the use of 
these materials against public transit stations and recommends it as a separate subject for 
urgent research 
This research is being provided to DHS which has requested MTI’s assistance in examining 
the use of highway-borne hazmat as a weapon. 
The team has sanitized its previous findings to make the report appropriate for a wider 
audience at an unclassified level. Any material that could provide terrorists with specific 
information not otherwise widely available concerning vulnerabilities and how to exploit 
them has been eliminated.
The team included:
Billy Poe, a nationally recognized expert on explosives and explosive devices and a 1. 
retired Louisiana State Police official. He has served as Director of the International 
Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators (IABTI). 
Douglas Reeves, an engineer by training who served for many years in the DOT’s 2. 
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) and its predecessor 
agency. Most recently, he led the risk-management team, served as deputy director of 
the technology division, and served as a focal point for hazardous-materials security 
issues after the 9/11 attacks.
Karl Shrum, a former Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) hazardous-materials 3. 
investigator in the state of California who also helped craft many aviation security rules 
and policies in the Federal Aviation Administration. He spent more than five years at 
TSA, where he focused on security measures for hazardous-materials shipments
Joseph Trella, an active duty officer in the U.S. Army during the 1990s who also served 4. 
as senior policy analyst for the National Governors Association and as special assistant 
for homeland security to the governor of Maryland.
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MTI took a broad look at terrorist thinking, targets, and operational considerations involved 
in weaponized hazmat to determine the relative likelihood of attacks using highway-borne 
hazmat against various targets across the country. The methodology used by the MTI 
team was an informal one that made extensive use of both current data and analyses from 
multiple sources and individual team specialties and experiences. The team met multiple 
times, both physically and by telephone. The methodology that was used is described 
below and is shaped by posing and answering six key questions that are listed here. 
The methodology requires detailed examination of hazardous materials and hazardous 
materials regulations, which in turn requires the use of a number of acronyms. A list of all 
acronyms used in the report is provided on 51.
 
Hazmat Examined in this Report 
Flammable liquids, such as gasoline•	
Flammable gases, such as propane•	
Truckload explosives, such as ammonium nitrate fuel oil (ANFO)•	
Toxic-inhalation-hazard (TIH) materials (such as chlorine*) •	
*Included only to help assess the likelihood of the other three materials being used and against which targets.
outline of this report
The chapter titled “Commodity Flows”  provides information on the overall frequency and 
routing of each hazardous material considered. Toxic inhalation hazard (TIH) materials 
are included, even though they have no effect on infrastructure, because attacks involving 
them must be considered in analyzing terrorist targets and weapons and in determining 
the probability of hazmat being used to destroy highway infrastructure.
The chapter titled “Potential Destructive Effects of Hazardous Materials Used in Acts 
of Terrorism” describes the average and maximum destructive effects of each of the 
materials considered. All potential targets are included, and are not limited to highway 
infrastructure. 
The chapter titled “Public Information that Could Inspire and Inform Terrorists” outlines 
publicly available information on hazardous materials that might inspire terrorists to use 
them and could potentially educate them on how to acquire, deliver, and release them 
for maximum effect. This information includes descriptions of (1) accidents, especially 
spectacular accidents; (2) criminal activity; and (3) disposal operations for hazardous 
materials involved in derailments and other accidents.
The chapter titled “Current State of Security Regulation and Recommended Practices 
for the Highway Transportation of Hazardous Materials” summarizes security measures 
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required or recommended by the federal and state governments and by industry, and it 
assesses how these measures are being implemented by companies, based on the results 
of site visits. This section also includes observations on vehicle tracking, panic buttons, 
and immobilization technologies. A supplemental report on vehicle tracking has been 
presented to DHS separately, and is available as MTI publication 09-04, Implementation 
and Development of Vehicle Tracking and Immobilization Technologies.
The chapter titled “Analysis of the Threat and Potential Attacks” presents the core analysis 
of the study. We provide a general threat overview, and then consider how terrorists might 
consider using flammable liquids, flammable gases, and truckload explosives against all 
types of targets. We ask and answer five questions:
How do terrorists think about targets?1.  We examine the words, plots, and attacks of 
terrorist groups in general and jihadists in particular to prioritize targets and determine 
how attractive highway infrastructure is to terrorists. 
Assuming terrorists have access to specific hazardous materials, what targets 2. 
might be most attractive? After determining this set of targets, we then assume that 
Jihadist groups have acquired flammable liquids, flammable gases, truckload explosives, 
or TIH materials, and we determine which material works best against which target.
How do operational 3. considerations influence material and 
target selection? We examined several operational considerations: 
(1) How frequently do the materials move and how easy are those movements to 
predict? (2) How well are the materials protected?  (3) How much might terrorists actually 
know about the destructive capabilities of the materials? (4) What kind of technical and 
operational modifications would be required to increase the chances of creating an 
explosion or fire? (5) What are the probabilities and consequences of a successful 
attack?  We have sanitized the details of these considerations.
How does the sophistication of the terrorist group affect material and target 4. 
selection? We place jihadist terrorists into three distinct groups: lone operators, local 
al Qaeda-inspired cells, and a cell centrally-funded and directed by al Qaeda with 
considerable resources and planning time. We consider how materials can be acquired 
and delivered to targets, how reconnaissance of targets might be conducted, and how 
the materials might have to be released. We determine the attack sequences that are 
most likely to be performed by the different types of terrorist groups or individuals.
what kinds of attacks using highway-borne hazmat are terrorist groups most 5. 
likely to conduct?  Using all of the information we developed about targets, hazardous 
materials, operational considerations, and terrorist groups, we consider how some of 
the more likely attacks would be carried out, why, and against which targets. 
We conclude with some confidence that truck-borne hazardous materials are unlikely to 
be used to target highway infrastructure. Iconic targets such as the Brooklyn Bridge worth 
attacking are unlikely to be destroyed, and those that can be destroyed are not worth 
attacking. By contrast, the use of hazardous materials—particularly gasoline and to a 
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lesser degree propane tankers—against public buildings and gatherings is a cause for 
much greater concern. These gatherings can include large numbers of people gathered 
in mass transit stations, which MTI’s own database suggests are targets of bombings 
and incendiary attacks. We also conclude that while government and industry tend to be 
dismissive of the security threats from flammable liquids, flammable liquids—particularly 
gasoline tankers—pose security threats that should not be minimized. 
This key judgment, and others, predate recently issued government assessments 
that stress that because of the difficulty of acquiring explosives, terrorists are turning 
to flammable liquids and to tankers, from which the principal threat is fire used against 
public assemblies or residential targets, and other assessments that al Qaeda is using its 
engineering capabilities to consider how to best weaponize gasoline tankers.
  
Clearly, gasoline tankers and, to a lesser extent, propane tankers, are important weapons 
of opportunity. They can be used create fires tsuhat could cause significant casualties in 
attacks on public and residential targets, a possible threat the federal government has 
recently addressed. While the size of the fleet and its importance to the economy pose real 
challenges in terms of implementing countermeasures, this should not cause government 
and industry to avoid facing the risks they pose, and creating a strategy for strengthening 
and sustaining security measures. 
It is a challenge we need to face up to.
MTI’s concern about gasoline tankers predates the most recent government assessments by 
many months and is Appendi underscored by them. A year ago, MTI concluded that:
Terrorists have a continuing interest in large truck bombs—vehicle-borne improvised •	
explosive devices (VBIEDs).
Acquiring and manufacturing explosives and achieving large-scale explosions are a •	
significant	challenge	to	terrorist	groups—especially	local	groups	that	lack	access	to	
instruction or out-of-country training.
Given recent increased monitoring of sales of ammonium nitrate, the risks of acquiring this •	
common ingredient in terrorist truck bombs have increased, and this may push terrorists 
toward other, more easily accessible hazmat cargos.
It is known that terrorists have discussed the use of propane, gasoline, and other hazmat to •	
enhance and/or substitute for conventional explosives.
If	terrorists	cannot	obtain	explosives,	they	turn	to	the	use	of	fire.•	
Terrorists have considered gasoline tankers as a potential weapon for creating destructive •	
fires.
Gasoline tankers could be used with considerable lethality against buildings and public •	
assemblies.
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 coMModity flows
why study commodity flows?  
In this section, we consider four commodities: flammable liquids, flammable gases, 
truckload explosives, and toxic-inhalation-hazard (TIH) materials, such as chlorine, and 
we outline how often and where these commodities are transported in the United States. 
We include TIH materials because, even though they cannot be used against highway 
infrastructure, terrorists will consider using them in attacks.
This analysis is important because it enables us to determine the availability of the materials 
during their transportation and how predictably they flow (see “Public Information that 
Could Inspire and Inform Terrorists” beginning on page 25). Terrorists are opportunists, 
and a commodity that is transported in great volumes and with predictability may be more 
desirable than one that flows infrequently or randomly.
composite Picture of Hazmat flows
The quality of data on hazmat flows of interest in this study varies. Data on rail flows are 
typically much better than data on highway flows. The Commodity Flow Survey conducted 
by the Department of Transportation and the Department of Commerce is the best overall 
source of data; however, because of survey limitations, it includes only materials that have 
significant shipments. 
A shipment is defined as a single movement of goods, commodities, or products from an 
establishment to a single customer or to another establishment owned or operated by the 
originating establishment (e.g., a warehouse, distribution center, or retail or wholesale 
outlet). Full or partial truckloads are counted as single shipments only if all commodities 
on the truck are destined for the same location. If a truck makes multiple deliveries on a 
route, the goods delivered at each stop are counted as individual shipments. For example, 
a gasoline tanker that picks up 8,000 gallons at a terminal and delivers it to a gasoline 
station would be considered one shipment; a truckload of explosives transported from a 
warehouse to two users at different locations would be considered two shipments. DOT has 
specific definitions for bulk shipments. What might be generally considered to be a large 
shipment varies by commodity. Highway shipments of more than a few thousand gallons 
or pounds of the materials of interest in this study would be considered large shipments.
To illustrate how commodity flows affect just one state, MTI looked at a very large state—
California. According to the Commodity Flow Survey, approximately 9% of the total 
hazardous material shipped (by weight, for all classes and all modes) in the United States 
in 2002 went in or through California. Data from the 2002 Commodity Flow Survey for 
the highway shipment of hazardous materials of interest in this study are shown in Table 
1 on page 10. Our ballpark estimates of the number of large shipments in California are 
also shown. As the table illustrates, when only the largest commodity in each category is 
considered, the vast majority of large shipments in California are shipments of gasoline 
(82.9%), followed by propane (12.1%). Shipments of anhydrous ammonia (a TIH material) 
constitute 3.8%, and explosives shipments constitute 1.3%. Based on a small number of 
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chlorine tankers nationwide, the number and percentage of chlorine shipments in California 
is considered very small, less than 1%.
selected Hazardous Materials Highway shipmentstable 1  
 
Hazardous Material
national
Highway 
tonsa
estimateb of  
number of large 
shipments 
in california
% of large 
shipments 
in california
Explosives—Hazard Class 1       4,361
         Division 1.5 explosives       3,972     35,000   1.3
Flammable gases—Division 2.1     44,031
         Petroleum gases (e.g., propane)     30,426   320,000 12.1
Toxic inhalation hazard TIH) materials—
Division 2.3     12,574
         Anhydrous ammonia       7,691   100,000   3.8
Flammable liquids   948,619
         Gasoline   606,724 2,200,000 82.9
Total hazardous material shipment
(all classes) 1,159,514
a In thousands. Source: Department of Transportation and Department of Commerce, Commodity Flow 
Survey (CFS) 2002—Hazardous Materials, December 2004.
b Derived by dividing total national highway tons by a typical transport vehicle and scaling for California. 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
Percentage of total
Chlorine
Explosives
Propane
Gasoline Tankers
estimated Breakdown of studied commodities on california 
Highways
figure 1  estimated Breakdown of studied commodities on calfornia 
Highways
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Flammable Liquids
Given the role of the automobile in American society, it is not surprising that the vast majority 
of hazardous material transportation by tonnage involves gasoline. Gasoline is usually 
moved to storage terminals by pipeline or vessel. Tank trucks form the last transportation 
leg, delivering gasoline from storage terminals or tank farms to gas stations. 
Gasoline is usually transported in MC 306 or MC 406 tank trucks2 with four or five 
compartments and a nominal 9,000-gallon total capacity. Tank shell construction is 
typically of 1/5-inch aluminum. (Weight considerations are a critical factor in gasoline 
transportation—the tank trucks that carry flammable and TIH compressed gases under 
pressure typically have 5/8- to 3/4-inch steel tanks.)  Gasoline trucks are unloaded from the 
bottom through hoses attached to lines from each of the compartments, which terminate at 
a central location. To discharge the gasoline, the air-pressure system must first be activated 
to open the valves. After that, gravity draws the gasoline out. 
Annually, there are roughly 19 million truckload shipments of gasoline in the United States. 
The average one-way trip from tank farm to gas station covers approximately 35 miles. 
Shipments are most often from the source to a single gas station, where the entire content 
is unloaded. Gasoline tank truck operation typically runs 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. 
In the United States, gasoline is the only hazardous material that has to be transported by 
highway this frequently. 
Other flammable and combustible materials transported in great quantities by highway in 
the United States include diesel fuel and fuel oil. The latter is used extensively in residential 
heating and is usually delivered by nominal 3,000-gallon straight trucks. Although these 
materials are somewhat more difficult to ignite (this may be of more significance from a 
safety standpoint than a security standpoint), they have higher heat content. Users have 
easy access to large quantities of these materials outside of transportation (e.g., through 
600-gallon residential heating tanks). 
Flammable Gases
Propane is the most commonly transported flammable gas. It is used to heat homes 
(particularly in rural areas where natural gas is unavailable), for cooking, and to power 
vehicles. It is usually transported as a liquefied compressed gas in tank trucks or 
cylinders. 
Pipelines, vessels, and rail cars move propane to terminals or regional distribution centers. 
In addition, nominal 10,000-gallon tank trucks (the national fleet contains approximately 
7,000 highway bulk transport trucks) assist in moving propane to local distributors. A 
national fleet of approximately 35,000 bobtails, or nominal 3,000-gallon tank trucks, move 
the propane to residential users, who typically have a 500-gallon on-site storage tank for 
heating. Bobtail deliveries are typically made to a series of customers until the tank truck is 
emptied. Bobtail trucks are unloaded though long hoses, using a small pump. 
The MC 330 or MC 331 tank truck fleets used to transport propane often alternate between 
transporting flammable gases in the winter (heating) season and transporting anhydrous 
ammonia during the spring and summer (or agricultural) season. 
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Explosives
Explosives are transported for military and commercial uses. Commercial uses are 
predominantly in mining and construction. Explosives are transported primarily by 
highway.
Division 1.1 explosives (those with a mass explosion hazard) and Division 1.5 explosives 
(very insensitive explosives with a mass explosion hazard) are the most important from a 
security perspective. Most Division 1.1 explosives are transported for the military, although 
a small amount of Division 1.1 explosives is used commercially to initiate Division 1.5 
explosives. Division 1.1 explosives account for a minimal amount (by weight) of the total 
explosives shipped by highway. Commercial use of Division 1.5 explosives is greater than 
military use.
Explosives are typically shipped from the manufacturer to a distributor or end user. Most 
Division 1.5 explosives are ammonium nitrate fuel oil (ANFO) mixtures or water gels, 
emulsions, or slurries shipped to the sites of usage, such as mining or construction sites, 
where they are used to break up or demolish ores or structures. Capacities of bulk trucks 
carrying Division 1.5 explosives range from 5 to 15 tons.
Ammonium nitrate is not classified as an explosive during transportation; it is classified 
as an oxidizer because of the environment and forces normally encountered during 
transportation. However, it causes security concerns because it can be used to create an 
explosion when mixed with other materials. Approximately nine million tons of ammonium 
nitrate are produced annually in the United States and used in agriculture as a fertilizer 
and in the production of explosives, such as ANFO. Ammonium nitrate is shipped by truck, 
rail, and vessel. The capacity of a truck carrying bulk quantities of ammonium nitrate is 
typically in the range of 20 tons. 
Toxic-Inhalation-Hazard (TIH) Materials
Anhydrous ammonia and chlorine are the two TIH materials most commonly shipped 
by highway; the majority of these shipments (more than 80 percent) are of anhydrous 
ammonia. Other TIH materials relatively frequently shipped by highway include fuming 
sulfuric acid, ethylene oxide, sulfur dioxide, bromine, phosgene, hydrogen cyanide, and 
hydrogen fluoride.
Anhydrous ammonia is used as a fertilizer, as a feedstock for other chemical manufacturing, 
and as a refrigerant. Most of it by far is used as fertilizer. Anhydrous ammonia is transported 
in MC 330 and MC 331 tank trucks, portable tanks (nominal 200-gallon), and cylinders 
(nominal 20-gallon). Anhydrous ammonia nurse tanks, most with a capacity of 1,000 to 
1,500 gallons, are often seen in agricultural applications. 
Chlorine has a large number of industrial uses. It is also used as a disinfectant for municipal 
water supplies, although there are indications that this use may be decreasing.3  
Chlorine is transported by highway in MC 330 or MC 331 tank trucks, “ton” tanks (nominal 
200-gallon), or cylinders (nominal 20-gallon). Much more chlorine (in terms of tons or ton 
miles) is transported by rail than by highway.
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Potential destrUctive effects of HazardoUs 
Materials Used in acts of terrorisM
Hazardous materials transportation has a good safety record. However, that record does 
not directly translate to the effects that could be caused by terrorists. One would expect 
terrorists to use hazardous materials in a manner that causes maximum destructive 
consequences and in ways that are not normally encountered during transportation. For 
example, a large quantity of gasoline placed in or close to a large building and ignited 
might overwhelm sprinkler systems and other control mechanisms and create a far greater 
fire hazard than would normally be expected in transportation. In the case of explosives, 
in particular, secondary hazards, such the collapse of a building, tunnel, or bridge, would 
exaggerate consequences. 
 
Hazardous materials that might be used to directly attack highway infrastructure such as 
overpasses, bridges, or tunnels would likely be flammable liquids, flammable gases, or 
explosives. Use of highway infrastructure can be seriously affected by uncertainty about 
the effects of damage on safety. Other hazardous materials, such as TIH materials, pose 
significant security concerns because of the large number of fatalities or injuries that could 
result from their intentional release; however, they would not damage infrastructure.  
 
Flammable liquids, flammable gases, explosives, and TIH materials form a first tier of 
hazardous materials to be concerned with from a security perspective when considering 
a broad range of targets; however, other materials also pose security risks. Poisonous 
materials, such as pesticides, could be used to contaminate water or food supplies. 
Oxidizers, such as liquid oxygen, could be used to enhance fires or explosions. Nuclear 
materials accumulated for medical shipments could be used in denial-of-service scenarios 
for key buildings or locations. Strong corrosive materials could be used to damage 
critical infrastructure. Flammable solids could be used to create intense fires. Although 
the possibilities are almost endless, there is a general consensus that flammable liquids, 
flammable gases, explosives, and TIH materials pose the greatest security concerns 
because of shipment quantities, destructive potential, immediate and dramatic impact, and 
the history of their use in terrorist incidents and plots, among other factors. Consequently, 
this study focuses on these four materials.
 
The effects of hazardous materials events on transportation infrastructure depend in 
large measure on characteristics of the infrastructure itself. For instance, vulnerabilities 
of an overpass or bridge to terrorism or sabotage may be magnified if the failure of critical 
components can be expected to result in the failure of the entire structure. 
flammable liquids  
The primary hazard posed by flammable liquids is fire, which could be used to damage 
infrastructure. The quantity of airline fuel in the tanks of the airplanes that brought down 
the World Trade Center on 9/11 was approximately the quantity carried in a large gasoline 
tank truck.
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The ability of flammable liquids to damage infrastructure has been demonstrated by a 
number of spectacular incidents. For example, in October 1997, a gasoline tank truck 
was struck by a passenger car in Yonkers, New York, under an overpass of the New York 
State Thruway. The ensuing fire damaged the overpass, and the thruway remained closed 
for approximately six months. This incident caused DOT to consider prohibiting wetlines5 
under gasoline tank trucks.6 
In this and other incidents, the intense heat from hazardous-materials fire caused the 
structural steel in an overpass to weaken or melt. Steel begins to lose its strength at 
temperatures as low as 800o F and melts at approximately 2,750o F. In addition, concrete 
can be damaged by intense heat when water trapped within its structure boils, cracks it, 
and breaks it into pieces (a phenomenon known as spalling). 
Gasoline fires are complex events. Factors that affect consequences include burning rate, 
quantity of fuel available, heat of combustion, heat release rate, access to oxygen, the 
size of the gasoline pool, temperature, wind speed, duration of fire, features that confine 
or trap heat, and availability of other combustible material. Gasoline tank-truck fires of the 
type cited in the above incidents have several features that tend to maximize potential 
damage:  (1) they are intense fires that persist over an extended period of time, (2) they are 
localized, (3) there is good access to oxygen, and (4) heat is trapped below an overhead 
structure. 
flammable gases
The primary hazard posed by a flammable gas is fire. A fireball or vapor-cloud fire releases 
thermal energy that can damage infrastructure. It can also ignite other flammable materials 
to create an intense fire.
Although a fire is the most likely outcome of a successful attack using a flammable gas, 
such as propane, an explosion could also occur under certain circumstances. It is very 
difficult to create conditions that would result in an explosion, and such an occurrence 
would more likely be due to chance than to an intentional act. A boiling-liquid expanding-
volume explosion (BLEVE) is a particularly spectacular hazardous-materials event and 
is described below. A fuel-air explosive is a carefully engineered military application of 
a vapor-cloud explosion that a terrorist might hope to emulate, as discussed later in this 
report, but it is very difficult to improvise. The bottom line is that igniting propane is relatively 
easy; causing it to explode at the right time and place is very difficult.
A BLEVE can occur when a liquefied gas is involved in a fire, particularly when flames 
impinge on the tank above the liquid level. Tank-shell metal weakens and the vapor 
pressure rapidly increases, overwhelming pressure-relief devices. Tank rupture under 
these conditions will violently and nearly instantaneously disperse large quantities of 
vapor and liquid to the atmosphere. If the liquefied gas is a flammable material and a 
source of ignition is present, a massive fire or explosion is possible. BLEVEs were fairly 
frequent in rail transportation before thermal protection, head shields, and improved 
shelf couplers were added to tank cars. A BLEVE is thought to have occurred in Italy in 
the tunnel between Palermo and Punta Raisi airport in 1996 after a tank truck carrying 
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)7 was involved in an accident and fire. The time between the 
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initial fire and the BLEVE allowed most of the people in the area to escape and limited the 
number of fatalities. The tunnel was closed for 2 1/2 days.
Tables 2 and 3 illustrate the differences between flammable liquids and flammable gases. 
Table 2 shows the energy content of different liquids and gases. Clearly, gasoline contains 
more energy than propane. Table 3 shows the relative capabilities of gasoline and propane 
for damaging highway infrastructure and other targets. 
table 2  selected Hazardous Materials Highway shipments
 
energy content 
(BtUs per gallon)
Ethanol   76,000
Fuel Oil (Number 2) 139,000
Gasoline 125,000
Propane   91,600
table 3 comparison of gasoline and Propane and the characteristics that 
enable greater damage to all targets
gasoline Propane
More intense fire based on packaging size and 
energy content
X
Ability to direct heating to a specific area X
Capable of longer duration fire X
Ease of opening packaging and igniting contents X
Ability to ignite other combustible materials at
greater distances (more diffuse effects)
X
Potential to cause an explosion X
explosives
The direct hazard posed by explosives is the blast overpressure created by an explosion. 
Debris and danger from structural collapse pose additional threats to infrastructure and 
people. Table 4 on page 18 provides estimates of damage caused by overpressure.
Highway infrastructure theoretically can be damaged by placing relatively small quantities 
of explosives at critical locations. More generalized damage could result from using very 
large quantities of bulk explosives in the vicinity of the infrastructure. 
The power of explosives is often expressed in terms of TNT equivalency. Relative 
effectiveness compares effectiveness relative to TNT by weight only. Table 5 on page 18 
provides relative effectiveness values for a number of explosives. Figure 2 shows distances 
of concern relative to the effects of overpressure. 
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table 4 explosion-overpressure damage estimatesa
overpressure
(psig)b
expected damage
0.04 Loud Noise (143 Db); Sonic Boom Glass Failure
0.15 Typical Glass Failure
0.40 Limited Minor Structure Damage
0.50–1.0 Windows Usually Chattered; Some Window Frame Damage
0.70 Minor Damage
1.0 Partial Demolition of Houses; Houses Made Uninhabitable
1.0–2.0 Corrugated Metal Panels Fail and Buckle; Housing Wood Panels
Blown in
1.0–8.0 Range for Slight to Serious Lacerations From Flying Glass and other 
Missiles
2.0 Partial Collapse of Walls and Roofs Of Houses
2.0–3.0 Non-Reinforced Concrete Or Cinderblock Wall Shattered
2.4–12.2 Range For 1–90 Percent Eardrum Rupture Among Exposed 
Populations
2.5 50 Percent Destruction of Home Brickwork
3.0 Distortion of Steel Frame Building And Pulling Away From 
Foundation
5.0 Snapping of Wooden Utilities Poles
5.0–7.0 Nearly Complete Destruction of Houses
7.0 Overturning of Loaded Train Boxcars
9.0 Demolition of Loaded Train Boxcars
10.0 Probably Total Building Destruction
14.5–29.0 Range For The 1–99 Percent Fatalities Among Exposed Populations 
Due to Direct Blast Effects
a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Emergency Management, ALOHA User’s Manual, 
Washington DC, February 2007.
b Peak pressures formed in excess of normal atmospheric pressure by blast and shock wages; psig=pounds 
per square inch gauge.
table 5  relative effectiveness of explosives
Material effectiveness
Black powder 0.55
ANFO 0.80
TNT 1.00
C-4 1.34
Nitroglycerin 1.50
RDX 1.60
PETN 1.66
Semtex 1.66
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figure 2  distances of concern for explosive overpressure
tiH Materials
In contrast to the impact of other hazardous materials considered in this study, the impact 
of the deliberate use of TIH materials in an act of terrorism or sabotage would be almost 
exclusively on people. Fatalities and injuries are the desired outcome. Casualties can occur 
either as a direct result of the materials or due to ensuing panic and crowd behavior (e.g., 
a stampede to an exit). TIH materials carry the specter of chemical warfare and weapons 
of mass destruction that may exaggerate their danger; however, the security concern they 
have generated is legitimate.
TIH materials may be gases or liquids at normal temperatures. Most TIH gases and vapors 
are heavier than air, which contributes to risk when they are released. TIH classification 
is based on toxicity for gases and a combination of vapor concentration and toxicity for 
liquids. Key terms and definitions applicable to TIH materials are given in Table 6 on page 
22. Table 7 on page 23 lists properties of TIH materials that are most often transported by 
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highway.
Release of a large quantity of TIH materials in a heavily populated are a feared scenario. 
Rapid release of the entire contents of a tank truck carrying TIH materials would minimize 
the time to react, evacuate, or shelter the population or to take other protective measures. 
Predicting fatalities from an attack involving TIH materials in transportation is exceedingly 
difficult. The variables that need to be considered include: 
 • Amount of release
 • Time over which release occurs
 • Wind speed and direction
 • Temperature
 • Daytime or nighttime conditions
 • Reaction effects of vegetation, rain, and humidity
 • Population present
 • Location of population
 • Sheltering or evacuation and emergency response that occurs
 • Susceptibility of the population to fatalities or injuries.
Models such as ALOHA, HPAC, CASRAM, and commercial models generally calculate 
exposure zones or numbers of people exposed to specific concentrations. Translating 
these to expected fatalities and injuries presents another level of difficulty. Many of the 
larger numbers quoted with regard to TIH materials are potential exposures or casualties. 
Moreover, casualties include both fatalities and injuries, which may be minor. The term 
casualty often gets translated to fatality in subsequent reporting or use, which exaggerates 
estimates of maximum damage.
Figure 3 on page 21 illustrates exposure zones to release of a TIH material. The concentration 
of TIH materials moves downwind and decreases over time once the release has ended. 
Casualties vary by level and duration of exposure. The contours in Figure 3 can be viewed 
as boundary levels between defined concentrations. For instance, the black portion may 
be considered LC50 concentrations (defined in Table 6). One would expect many fatalities 
among people present for a significant time within this zone. The next contour may show 
the boundaries of ERPG-3 exposures (defined in Table 6). Some fatalities and a substantial 
number of injuries might be expected in this zone. The risk increases as a person comes 
closer to the boundary between LC50 concentrations and ERPG-3 concentrations. It 
decreases as the person approaches the ERPG-2 concentration boundary. The lightest 
contour represents ERPG-1 concentrations, where only mild, transient health effects might 
be expected.
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exposure zones to a tiH Material release (shaded contours illustrate figure 3 
lc50 and erPg concentrations as described in the preceding  
paragraph)
Modeling done in the National Risk Assessment for Selected Hazardous Materials in 
Transportation8 suggests that fatalities from a well-executed and successful attack involving 
TIH materials could number in the thousands. The study estimated the number of persons 
who would potentially be affected in transportation accidents in ten-year periods over an 
extremely long period of time. Single, large events, the probabilities of which are very 
low, would be expected to dominate results. While the study suggests that the worst-case 
highway accident for the worst TIH material considered (chlorine) could result in many 
thousands of deaths, it did not include effects of sheltering (passive or active), which could 
reduce the number of fatalities on average by a factor of 7. This suggests that a few 
thousand may be the upper limit of fatalities that would occur as the result of a catastrophic 
outside release of TIH materials in highway transportation, an estimate that has been 
buttressed by more-recent studies.
 
Achieving this level of fatalities would be difficult. The ability to control a plume and the 
unpredictability of results make TIH materials a less-than-ideal choice as a weapon of 
mass destruction. A credible attack using truckload quantities of TIH materials in which 
everything went as planned (a highly successful attack) could be expected to result in 
perhaps as many as a few hundred fatalities; a typical successful attack might produce 
dozens of fatalities. Introduction of a TIH material into a building with many people present, 
although requiring a greater degree of operational sophistication, is another scenario that 
potentially could produce a significant number of fatalities. 
The most significant transportation accident involving chlorine occurred near Graniteville, 
South Carolina, in January 2002. A rail car carrying approximately 90 tons of chlorine was 
breached after an accident caused by a switching error. A substantial proportion of the 
chlorine was released from the rail car, resulting in the evacuation of 5,400 people within 
one mile of the accident, including the town of Graniteville. Nine people were killed, including 
the engineer and a number of employees at the Avondale Mills plant near the accident 
location. Given the nature of the accident and the population nearby, more fatalities might 
have been expected.
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Table 6  Terms and Definitions Applicable to TIH Materials
term Definition 
TIH Toxic inhalation hazard, a term used to describe gases and volatile 
liquids that are toxic when inhaled. The term is used synonymously 
with poison inhalation hazard (PIH).
Hazard Zone One of four levels of hazard (A thought D) assigned by hazardous 
materials transportation regulations to gases and one of two levels of 
hazard (Aand B) assigned to liquids that are toxic when inhaled. 
Hazard Zone A Gases: LC50 less than or equal to 200 ppm. Liquids: V equal to or 
greater than 500 LC50, and LC50 less than or equal to 00 ppm.
Hazard Zone B Gases: LC50 creater than 200 ppm and less than or equal to 1000 
ppm. Liquids: V equal to or greater than 10 LC50, and LC50 less 
than or equal to 1000 ppm; criteria for Hazard Zone A are not met. 
Hazard Zone C LC50 greater than 1000 ppm and less than or equal to 3000 ppm.
Hazard Zone D LC50 greater than 3000 ppm and less than or equal to 5000 ppm.
ERPGs Emergency response planning guidelines, values intended to 
provide estimates of concentration ranges above which one could 
reasonably anticipate observing adverse health effects.
ERPG-2 The maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed 
nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without 
experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects 
or symptoms that could impair an individual’s ability to take protective 
action.
ERPG-3 The maximum concentration below which it is believed nearly all 
individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or 
developing live-threatening health effects.
LC50 The concentration of a material administered by inhalation that is 
expected to cause the death of 50 percent of an experimental animal 
population within a specified time.
V Saturated vapor concentration in air of a material in mL/m3 (volatility) 
at 20°C and standard atmospheric pressure.
ERG Protective 
Action Distance
Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG) Protective Action Distances 
are estimates that have been developed based on historical 
transportation incidents. Factors considered include quantities of 
materials released, rates at which the materials were released, and 
meteorological conditions. Guidebook distances are 90 percent 
values based on ERPG-2 distances (i.e., in 90% of the incidents, 
distances are less than the ERG value).
Note: ppm=parts per million; mL/m3=millimeters per cubic meter
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table 7  Properties of select tiH Materials
chemical
Hazard
zone
lc50
(ppm)
erPg-2
(ppm)
erPg-3
(ppm)
Boiling
Point
(°f)
erg 
Protective
action
distance
(in miles, 
large spill,a at 
night)
Ammonia, anhydrous D 4000 150 750   -28.03 1.4
Bromine A 113 0.5 5 137.80 4.6
Chlorine B 293 3 20  -30.23 4.6
Ethylene oxide D 4350 50 500   51.26 1.5
Hydrogen chloride C 2810 20 150 -118.66 6.5
Hydrogen cyanide B 40 10 25    78.80 2.3
Hydrogen fluoride, 
anhydrous C 1300 20 50   66.92 2.7
Phosgene A 5 0.2 1   46.94   7.0+
Sulfur dioxide C 2520 3 15 14 3.9
Sulfuric acid, fuming B 347
10 mg/
m3
30 mg/
m3 625 4
a  A large spill could be from a tank truck, a rail car, or a number of smaller packagings.
conclusions 
Flammable liquids, flammable gases, explosives, and TIH materials are all potential terrorist 
weapons; they all allow terrorists to meet threshold levels of average consequence, but 
with varying likelihood of success. However, explosives and flammable liquids would seem 
to be the most likely highway-borne hazmat weapons. Experience with explosives, the 
instantaneous nature of associated damage, and the potentially devastating consequences 
of an explosion favor their use.  
Nevertheless, flammable liquids, particularly gasoline, are widely available in large 
quantities in transportation, as discussed in “Commodity Flows” beginning on page 9. 
Equally important, they could easily be used against an array of potential soft targets. 
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PUBlic inforMation tHat coUld insPire and 
inforM terrorists
Terrorists and terrorist groups often use public, “open” sources to gain information about 
potential targets and weapons. The 9/11 conspirators studied aviation security by examining 
public reports of security measures, conducting reconnaissance, and observing security 
measures in dry runs.
We explore in later sections the ways terrorists might conduct surveillance. In this section, 
we discuss the information terrorists could gain from the open literature about the effects 
of the hazardous materials considered in this study.
We believe that three types of data in particular could inspire and instruct terrorist thinking 
about the use of hazardous materials:  (1) how the materials behave in accidents, including 
spectacular, newsworthy events; (2) how the materials are acquired in publicized non-
terrorist crimes; and (3) how materials involved in accidents behave in publicly known 
disposal operations.
accident Histories
Information on hazardous materials involved in highway accidents indicates how the 
materials behave when they are released in an accident, how many casualties they can 
cause, and how much damage they can inflict on highway infrastructure. This information 
may be studied by terrorist groups seeking to understand the advantages of weaponizing 
different types of hazmat.
Two distinct “sets” of information are available to terrorists:  (1) analytical studies and official 
data analyses that identify trends and averages, and (2) histories of individual accidents, 
especially spectacular accidents that generate publicity. 
Analytical Studies and Data Analyses
The most authoritative data on hazardous materials reside in the Hazardous Materials 
Information Reporting System (HMIRS) maintained by DOT’s Pipeline and Hazardous 
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). The National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) also studies high-consequence accidents (or, defined more narrowly for highway 
purposes, crashes) and conducts special studies to identify risk trends and problems. 
While a large quantity of data is available, we did not find any study focused narrowly on 
the consequences for highway infrastructure of fires and explosions caused by gasoline or 
propane tankers.
The available data must be carefully understood. For example, the higher casualty 
figures for commodities such as gasoline tankers may reflect the relatively large share 
of hazardous-materials highway shipments (estimated to be between 35% and 50%, 
depending on location, time of day, and time of year) they represent. 
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Also, there is no separate category of damage to highway infrastructure. Further, because 
carriers filling out reports may wish to understate damages, damage levels are probably 
underreported. MTI’s analysis indicated that only ten accidents between 1997 and 2007 
resulted in more than $1 million in property damage, and only five of these ten accidents 
created property damage of more than $2 million (between $2.5 and $4 million). These 
figures are questionable because accidents studied by the NTSB during this period 
resulted in high levels of damage. For example, property damage caused by an October 
19, 1997, gasoline tanker accident near an overpass on the New York State Thruway 
totaled $7 million.
Still, the data tend to suggest that even the classes or divisions of materials that cause 
the highest percentages of incidents, fires, property damage, and deaths in highway 
transportation accidents generate only modest amounts of damage. According to HMIRS 
data, the average amount of property damage would be well under $250,000, which is 
certainly modest compared with that created by explosives ($1 million).
However, we have examined the HMIRS data for the ten years between 1997 and 2007, 
which contained roughly 50,000 incident reports involving highway transportation, the vast 
majority of which took place during loading and offloading and included even small releases. 
MTI selected for more in-depth analysis 206 accidents,9 including some that involved more 
than one class or division of material, that (1) occurred in transit (as opposed to during 
unloading or loading, for example); (2) resulted in a fire, explosion, or gas dispersion; and 
(3) caused either one or more deaths, at least $85,000 in damage to the carrier,10 or at 
least $100,000 in damage to public property or to private parties other than the carrier.11 
Of these 206 accidents, 96% resulted in fires, 33% resulted in explosions, 14% resulted 
in gas dispersion, 42% resulted in at least one fatality, and 5% resulted in more than $1 
million in damages. 
This set of 206 accidents resulted in a total of 105 deaths, $34,487,939 in property damage, 
194 fires, 68 explosions, and 28 gas dispersions. The average death per accident was 
0.509, and the average property damage per accident was $167,417. 
We examined the hazardous materials involved in these 206 accidents and found the five 
classes or divisions that were involved in the largest number of accidents. They together 
constituted 90% of the accidents, 95% of the deaths, 97% of the property damage, 91% 
of the fires, 94% of the explosions, and 86% of the gas dispersions. We also found a 
small set of accidents (nine) that involved more than one class or division (and in these, 
flammable-combustible liquids were very often involved) and another small set (nine) that 
involved other classes or divisions. 
The distribution of accidents, deaths, property damage, fires, explosions, and gas 
dispersions, along with the average deaths and property damage per incident, are 
displayed in the chart below. As the chart reveals, the reported deaths per accident are 
low, as is the reported (and probably underreported) property damage.
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summary of 1997–2007 Hazardous Materials incident  table 8 
reporting system (HMirs) Highway crash data: five Most lethal 
classes or divisions
class accidents deaths  Property damage fires explosions
gas
dispersion
avg.
deaths
average 
loss
flammable/ 
combustible 
liquids
170 (83%) 94 (90%) $30,861,443 (89%) 161 (83%) 60 (88%) 18 (64%) 0.553 $ 181,538
flammable 
gases 7 (3.4%) 2 (1.9%) $160,500 (.5%) 7 (3.6%) 0 (0%) 3 (10.7%) 0.286 $  22,928
corrosive 
materials 6 (2.9%) 2 (1.9%) $239,000 (.7%) 3 (1.5%) 2 (2.9%) 3 (10.7%) 0.333 $  39,833
oxidizers 3 (1.5%)  2 (1.9%) $105,000 (.3%) 3 (1.5%) - - 0.667 $  35,000
explosives 2 (.9%) - $2,000,000 (5.8%) 2 (1%) 2 (2.9%) - 0 $1,000,000
total of 
5 leading 
classes
188 (90%)  100 (95%) $33,365,943 (97%) 176 (91%) 64 (94%) 24 (86%) 0.532 $ 180,123
Multiple 
classes per 
incident
9 (4.4%) 3 (2.9%) $314,996(.9%) 9 (4.6%) 2 (2.9%) 2 (7.1%) 0.333 $   34,999
all other 
classes 9 (4.4%) 2 (1.9%) $807,000 (2.3%) 9 (4.6%) 2 (2.9%) 2 (7.1%) 0.222 $   89,666
total  100% 206 105 $34,487,939 194 68 28 0.509 $ 167,417
The data on the five most classes or divisions most frequently involved in these 206 serious 
accidents are discussed below:
 
Flammable liquids1.  (the combustible-flammable class), including gasoline, gas oil, 
aviation gas, fuel oil, and ethanol, accounted for 83% of the accidents, 90% of the 
deaths, 89% of the property damage, 83% of the fires, 88% of the explosions, and 
64% of the gas dispersions. There was an average of 0.533 death per incident, and the 
average damage amounted to $181,538.
Flammable gases2. , particularly propane, accounted for 3.4% of the accidents, 1.9% of 
the deaths, 0.5% of the property damage, 3.6% of the fires, none of the explosions, and 
10.7% of the gas dispersions. There was an average of 0.236 death per incident, and 
the average damage amounted to $22,928.
Corrosive materials3. , including boron tribromide, amine and polamine liquids, and 
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batteries, accounted for 2.9% of the accidents, 1.9% of the deaths, 0.7% of the 
property damage, 1.5% of the fires, 2.9% of the explosions, and 10.7% of the gas 
dispersions. There was an average of 0.333 death per incident, and the average 
damage amounted to $39,833.
Oxidizers, 4. such as potassium permanganate, accounted for 1.5% of the 
accidents, 1.9% of the deaths, 0.3% of the property damage, 1.5% of the 
fires, and none of the explosions and gas dispersions. There was an average 
of 0.667 death per incident, and the average damage amounted to $35,000. 
Explosives5. , such as detonation fuses and boosters, accounted for 0.9% of the 
accidents, none of the deaths, 5.8% of the property damage, 1% of the fires, 2.9% 
of the explosions, and none of the gas dispersions. There were no deaths, and the 
average damage amounted to $1,000,000.
The 22 accidents of the 206 in these years in which there was either more than one 
death or more than $1 million in property damage (only 11% of the total) accounted for 
72% of the property damage and 32% of the deaths. Of these 22 serious accidents, 
flammable liquids accounted for all but two of the 34 deaths (94%) and $22,724,500 of 
the $24,729,50 in property damage (92%). 
Several rather simple but important observations could be drawn from these data by 
individuals seeking to weaponize flammable liquids, flammable gases, truckload 
explosives, or TIH materials.
First, there are no highway incidents involving TIH or chlorine in the database that resulted 
in damage to highway infrastructure. There was, in fact, only one incident involving TIH 
that caused a fire and property damage above the threshold established for this set of 
incidents.12 This may suggest that there are relatively few shipments of these materials 
and/or that safety controls and route restrictions are particularly effective.
Second, few accidents were caused by explosives, which may again be the result of 
 
From accident data, terrorists might learn that: 
 
Flammable liquids create fires that can engulf people and motorists and have the potential of 1. 
killing large groups of people if the people are trapped. 
Flammable gases can create spectacular fireballs and blasts that are intense and deadly and 2. 
potentially able to kill large numbers of people, but explosions are difficult to create with 
flammable gases. 
Explosives have huge destructive forces but are stable in the normal transportation 3. 
environment.
TIH materials such as chlorine can kill large numbers of people, but only if evacuation is 4. 
not possible. Also, the safety record of these materials is good. Media and government atten-
tion to TIH materials may be more significant for a terrorist than actual accidents are.
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relatively low levels of transportation, a relatively high level of safety and route controls, 
or the relative stability of many explosives unless intentionally discharged. The property 
damage per accident, however, is very high—by far the highest of any class.
Third, given the significant trade in propane, the fact that no accidents resulted in an 
explosion and only a few resulted in a fire suggests that the structure of the propane tanks 
is more robust than that of a gasoline tanker and that it is more difficult to create a fire or 
an explosion with propane than might be assumed.
Finally, flammable liquids such as gasoline—which constitute a large percentage of the 
hazmat being transported by road—are responsible for the highest percentage of deaths 
and property damage. Also, when normalized per incident, gasoline tanker accidents are 
roughly twice as lethal as other classes, with the sole exception of oxidizers.
This may lead terrorists to make the following observations: A great deal of flammable 
liquid such as gasoline is being transported by road, and crashes involving flammable 
liquids often result in fires. The fatality rate is low, especially considering that most of the 
casualties are the drivers, but this could simply be a function of where the gasoline is 
released. 
Studies and Coverage of Spectacular Accidents
Although the average destruction resulting from hazmat accidents is low, some of these 
accidents can be spectacular, particularly those involving propane, as indicated by excerpts 
from NTSB accident summaries. Some of these are listed below along with our own short 
summaries of more-recent accidents that meet the NTSB’s thresholds but have not yet 
been formally studied by NTSB and accidents that took place outside the United States 
and are therefore outside of NTSB’s jurisdiction. All of the accidents had significant news 
coverage, both locally and nationally. Information that would be particularly relevant for 
terrorists is italicized.
In these accidents, certain things would be understood by terrorists:
The fires created by flammable liquids can engulf motorists, bystanders, and residences 1. 
at some distance from the actual release. The potential to cause large numbers of 
casualties is clear.
The fireball and blast created by flammable gas can be intense and deadly. The strength 2. 
of the blast is determined by the size of the explosion and the distance that pieces of 
the vehicle travel after the explosion. Once again, the potential to cause large numbers 
of casualties is clear.
Explosives have significant force but are, in fact, stable.3. 
TIH materials can, if directed properly, cause a significant number of deaths. (Far more 4. 
information is available from rail tank car accidents than from highway accidents.) 
However, if the population at risk is alerted, evacuation is possible and major casualties 
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute Nat ional  Transportat ion Secur i ty Center of  Excel lence
Public Information That Could Inspire and Inform Terrorists28
can be avoided.
 
Accidents Involving Flammable Liquids
June 6, 2008: Atlanta, Georgia. A tanker truck accident closed I-85 near Atlanta. The fuel 
spilled, but there was no fire.
June 4, 2008: Tampa, Florida. A tanker on fire shut down traffic in both directions on I-75 
and 301 near Tampa. The fire caused significant damage to an overpass, which will be 
closed for weeks.
January 18, 2008: Providence, Rhode Island. A tanker truck exploded, showering 
surrounding buildings and houses with debris.
July 27, 2007: Register-Guard, Oregon. A gasoline tanker (a tractor towing two tanker 
trailers) exploded after catching fire. The cargo was 10,000 gallons of gasoline. Both tanks 
exploded. There were no injuries. Highway 58 was closed for six hours.
August 9, 1998: Biloxi, Mississippi. At about 12:53 a.m., a Premium Tank Lines, Inc., 
truck driver was transferring gasoline from a cargo tank to underground storage tanks at a 
Fast Lane gasoline station-convenience store in Biloxi, Mississippi, when an underground 
storage tank containing gasoline overflowed. An estimated 550 gallons of gasoline 
flowed from the storage tank, across the station lot into the adjacent highway, through an 
intersection, and into a storm drain. The gasoline ignited, and fire engulfed three vehicles 
near the intersection, which ultimately resulted in the deaths of five occupants and the 
serious injury of one. Damages were estimated at $55,000.13
October 9, 1997: Yonkers, New York. At about 12:10 a.m., a truck tractor pulling a cargo 
tank semi trailer was going under an overpass of the New York State Thruway when it 
was struck by a sedan. The car hit the right side of the cargo tank in the area of the tank’s 
external loading/unloading lines, releasing the gasoline they contained. The ensuing fire 
destroyed both vehicles and the overpass; the thruway remained closed for approximately 
6 months. The driver of the car was killed; the driver of the truck was not injured. Property 
damage was estimated at $7 million.14
March 17, 1993:  Fort Lauderdale, Florida.  About 3:13 p.m. on a Wednesday, an Amerada 
Hess (Hess) tractor-semi trailer hauling gasoline was struck by National Railroad Passenger 
Corporation (Amtrak) train 91. The truck driver was attempting to cross a railroad/highway 
grade crossing on Cypress Creek Road in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Traffic in the area of 
the crossing was congested because the left and center lanes were closed just over the 
crossing. Traffic was being channeled into the right lane and later shifted into a right-turn 
lane. The truck, which was loaded with 8,500 gallons of gasoline, was punctured when it 
was struck. A fire erupted, engulfing the truck and nine other vehicles. The fire killed the 
truck driver and five occupants of three stopped vehicles.15 
February 13, 1991: Carmichael, California. About 3 a.m. Pacific Standard Time, a 
tractor-semi trailer (cargo tank) overturned as the vehicle was traveling on a main urban 
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roadway in Carmichael, California.... At the time of the accident, the truck was being used 
for the intrastate delivery of gasoline to service stations; the cargo tank contained about 
8,800 gallons of automotive gasoline. The driver lost control of the vehicle in a curve. The 
vehicle overturned onto its side and struck the embankment of a drainage ditch located in 
a dirt field beside the road. The cargo tank bounced and came to rest in the dirt field and 
adjacent to the drainage ditch. The rear end of the cargo tank landed on an unoccupied 
car parked in the field. Gasoline from the cargo tank spilled into the drainage ditch, which 
extended under the roadway and behind private residences nearby. About 15 minutes after 
the overturn, the gasoline ignited behind a residence. The fire flashed back and engulfed 
the overturned cargo tank, and the car under the cargo tank. A second unoccupied car 
parked near the overturned tank truck also caught fire. Gasoline runoff in the drainage ditch 
entered the underground drainage system and was also ignited. In addition to the total loss 
of the tank truck, its cargo, and the two parked cars, four homes and their contents were 
destroyed or heavily damaged by fire, and the residents from a 2-mile-square area were 
evacuated.16
December 4, 1975: Seattle, Washington. About 1 a.m., a 1975 Peterbilt tank truck and 
a 1970 Peerless full trailer (tank), owned by Union Oil Company of California, went out 
of control on the Alaskan Way Viaduct in Seattle, Washington, as the driver attempted 
to negotiate a curve on the traffic-polished concrete roadway at 52 mph and during a 
rainstorm. The combination vehicle jackknifed and the trailer struck a viaduct support 
column. The trailer’s tank ruptured and its cargo of gasoline spilled. Fire ensued, spread 
along the viaduct, and spilled to the ground below, where it ignited 4 railroad freight cars, 30 
motor vehicles, and adjacent buildings. The accident caused property damage estimated 
at $750,000. Two firemen were injured while fighting the fire.17 
Accidents Involving Liquefied Petroleum Gas (Including but Not Limited to 
Propane) 
July 11, 2008: Tarragona, Spain. A large LPG truck exploded close to a campsite near 
Tarragona. The campsite was crowded with campers in tents and trailers at the time. The 
blast and fireball left a 5-foot deep, 65-foot wide crater and destruction within a 1,000-foot 
radius. More than 200 people were killed. The exact events surrounding the accident are 
subject to debate. The tank truck was not equipped with emergency pressure-relief devices 
and may have been overloaded and subject to thermal expansion from the sunshine, may 
have been in a vehicle crash, or may have been engulfed in fire, subsequently causing a 
BLEVE. 
July 27, 1994: White Plains, New York.  About 12:30 a.m., a tractor cargo-tank semi 
trailer loaded with 9,200 gallons of propane (a liquefied petroleum gas) and operated by 
Suburban Paraco Corporation was traveling east on Interstate 287 in White Plains, New 
York. The truck drifted across the left lane onto the left shoulder and struck the guardrail; 
the tank hit a column of the Grant Avenue overpass. The tractor and the semi trailer 
separated, and the front head of the tank fractured, releasing the propane, which vaporized 
into gas. The resulting vapor cloud expanded until it found a source of ignition. When it 
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ignited, according to an eyewitness, a fireball rose 200 or 300 feet in the air. The tank was 
propelled northward about 300 feet and landed on a frame house, engulfing it in flames. 
The driver was killed, 23 people were injured, and an area with a radius of approximately 
400 feet was engulfed by fire.18
April 29, 1975: Eagle Pass, Texas.  At 4:20 p.m., a Surtigas, S.A., tractor-tank-semi trailer, 
westbound on U.S. Route 277 near Eagle Pass, Texas, swerved to avoid an automobile 
ahead which was slowing for a turn. The tank-semi trailer separated from the tractor, 
struck a concrete headwall, and ruptured; vaporized LPG was released. The ensuing 
fire and explosion destroyed a building and 51 vehicles. The 51 persons who were in the 
area were burned and 16 persons, including the truck driver, were killed. The National 
Transportation Safety Board determined the cause of the fatalities and injuries to persons 
in the vicinity was the explosive force and fire, from which they had no time to escape. 
The rapid development of the explosive force and fire was caused by the gross rupture of 
the tank.19
September 21, 1972: New Jersey Turnpike. At 8:25 p.m., a tractor-semi trailer (tank) 
carrying propylene liquid petroleum gas sideswiped a Greyhound bus (carrying no 
passengers) in the southbound lanes of the New Jersey Turnpike about one mile north of 
Exit 8. After impact, the bus, while rotating clockwise and sliding across the highway, was 
struck by a southbound automobile. The tractor-semi trailer scraped, then straddled the 
turnpike’s median guardrail, jackknifed, spun into the northbound lanes, and overturned. 
Before overturning, the tractor-semi trailer was struck by a northbound automobile. Fire, 
which had erupted at the tractor as it scraped the median guardrail, spread to propylene 
which was leaking from the cargo tank’s damaged plumbing. After the fire had burned for 
about 25 minutes, the cargo tank exploded in a ball of flame; segments of the tank rocketed 
more than 1,300 feet northeast and 500 feet southwest of the tractor-semi trailer.20
March 9, 1972: Lynchburg, Virginia. At 2:30 p.m., a tractor-semi trailer (tank) carrying 
liquid propane under pressure was traveling north on U.S. Route 501 at approximately 
25 m.p.h. At a point 7.1 miles north of Lynchburg, Va., the truck…slid along the shoulder 
on its right side and struck a rock outcropping, which ruptured the tank and permitted the 
liquid propane to escape. On exposure to the atmosphere, the propane vaporized into a 
cloud, which spread rapidly throughout the area. Within 1 or 2 minutes a fire erupted in 
the propane-air mixture. The truck driver, apparently not injured in the rollover, fled on foot 
north from the overturned vehicle. When the propane-air mixture ignited, the truck driver 
was enveloped in the fire and was killed. Two southbound motorists, who had stopped 
their cars north of the overturned truck, and a passenger of one of the motorists were 
severely burned when the vapor cloud ignited. The occupants of a house located in a 
hollow below and west of the highway heard the crash and ran from the house, but were 
caught in the propane-air vapor flash and were severely burned. One of these victims died 
as a result of his burns. The house, outbuildings, and about 12 acres of woodland were 
destroyed in the ensuing fire.21
Accidents Involving Explosives
June 4, 1971: Waco, Georgia. At about 8:00 p.m., a 1961 Volkswagen two-door sedan, 
traveling west on U. S. Highway 78 (Old Georgia Route 8), crossed over the centerline of 
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the two-lane highway and collided head on with an eastbound tractor semitrailer transporting 
a 25,414-pound cargo of explosives. Both vehicles were traveling at about 40 mph before 
impact. Fire broke out immediately along the left side of the tractor and in front of the 
trailer. Firemen arrived at the scene shortly thereafter and tried to put out the fire while the 
truck driver tried to persuade bystanders to move from the burning wreckage. The cargo 
detonated about 10 or 15 minutes after the collision. The automobile driver apparently was 
fatally injured in the collision. The truck driver was not injured. Both drivers were alone in 
their vehicles. Two firemen, a wrecker driver, and two bystanders died as a result of the 
explosion. Thirty-three people were injured and property damage was estimated in excess 
of one million dollars…the cause of the explosion was localized heat on the nitroglycerin-
based dynamite. The explosion caused extensive property damage.
Accidents Involving TIH Materials
August 22, 2003: Middletown, Ohio.  At 7:17 a.m., an Amerigas Corporation (Amerigas) 
cargo tank semi trailer arrived at the AK Steel Corporation (AK Steel) facility in Middletown, 
Ohio. The driver pulled the vehicle up to the fill location and helped an AK Steel employee 
hook up to the fittings for a plant storage tank. According to the driver, about 7:40 a.m., the 
AK Steel employee began transferring anhydrous ammonia, a poisonous and corrosive 
gas, from the storage tank to the cargo tank. The driver said that it took about 30 minutes 
to equalize the pressure between the storage tank and the cargo tank. He said that once 
the pressure was equalized, the internal pressure in the cargo tank was 130 pounds per 
square inch gauge (psig). About 8:20 a.m., while the cargo tank was still being loaded, its 
front head cracked open, releasing vapor. The driver, who had been resting in the tractor, 
got out and saw the escaping vapor. He said that he activated the emergency shut off 
device for the cargo tank and that according to the gauges, the cargo tank was a little 
less than half full, the internal pressure was about 170 psig, and the temperature of the 
anhydrous ammonia was 80 degrees F. About 100 employees and contract workers were 
evacuated from the buildings downwind of the cargo tank and moved to safer locations. 
Five people were treated for inhalation injuries and released. The cost of repairing and 
replacing damaged equipment was about $25,000.
May 11, 1976: Houston, Texas. About 11:08 a.m., a Transport Company of Texas tractor-
semi trailer (tank) transporting 7,509 gallons of anhydrous ammonia struck and penetrated 
a bridge rail on a ramp connecting I-610 with the Southwest Freeway (U.S. 59) in Houston, 
Texas. The tractor and trailer left the ramp, struck a support column of an overpass, and 
fell onto the Southwest Freeway, approximately 15 feet below. The anhydrous ammonia 
was released from the damaged tank semi trailer. Six persons died as a result of the 
accident, 78 persons were hospitalized, and approximately 100 other persons were treated 
for injuries.... The cause of 5 of the 6 fatalities and all of the 178 injuries was the inhalation 
of anhydrous ammonia. 23
criMinal tHefts of fUel and fUel tanKers
Terrorists are opportunists; they maximize gain and minimize risk. Therefore, they look 
for easy, proven ways to increase the chances of obtaining materials and reaching their 
objectives. Purely criminal operations can inspire and instruct terrorist attacks on both 
counts. Airline hijackings gained prominence as a criminal activity, and ransom kidnappings 
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were purely criminal operations. Both tactics were subsequently adopted by terrorists. 
Publicized accounts of criminal activity assist a terrorist operation in several ways. First, 
for terrorists considering attacks using hazardous materials, they illustrate methods of 
purchasing or obtaining the materials, or obtaining a hazmat cargo vehicle itself. Second, 
accounts of criminal activity may illustrate ways of delivering a weapon to the target. By 
observing news accounts or perhaps connecting with or recruiting criminals, a  terrorist 
operative can become familiar with the ways others surreptitiously achieve an end that is 
similar to theirs and can then make adjustments to fit the technique to their objectives.
In January 2008 alone, multiple thefts of tankers occurred. In examining these and other 
attacks, several observations arise:
The theft of fuel oil appears to be a significant crime, requiring some level of organization. 1. 
In other words, it is the act not of a single criminal, but of a conspiracy—probably an 
informal, local one. This suggests that terrorists who seek knowledge of how fuel can 
be stolen can obtain it.
The theft of fuel appears to be related to fuel costs, if fuel prices increase, criminal thefts 2. 
will also increase. Thus, the motivation for and sophistication of the thefts will increase, 
and so will the knowledge of successful techniques. Most of the thefts have occurred 
where fuel oil is needed and transported the most: on the mid-Atlantic seaboard and 
in the Northeast, areas that account for nearly 80% of the fuel oil used in the United 
States.24
The fact that many thefts of tankers take place at night and from unguarded sites, some 3. 
of them by hot-wiring or using keys left in the trucks, suggests that security measures 
could be strengthened with relatively little effort.
Some of the thefts are simple hijackings at gunpoint with the driver in the rig, or thefts 4. 
of vehicles left unattended at a truck stop. Site visits performed by the authors of this 
report confirmed that there is a concern about common crime, including theft and non-
terrorist employee sabotage, and a general sense that the chances of hijacking are 
likely to grow when the price of fuel increases.
Smaller companies appear to experience more thefts, although whether the loss per 5. 
shipment is greater than that incurred by large companies cannot be determined with 
current data. It may also be that security measures used by smaller companies are 
more easily circumvented, but this is subject to verification.
The relatively few incidents in which the truck rig is damaged suggest that thieves and 6. 
hijackers are familiar with trucks and that they have at least minimal driving skills, as 
well as basic insider knowledge of the trade. Site visits confirm that while a complete 
novice might have difficulty driving a stolen tanker truck, the level of sophistication 
needed to drive a rig and discharge the fuel is hardly insurmountable and could be 
achieved in a few days; some newer tractors have automatic transmissions, which 
makes them easier to drive.
There are indications of insider collusion. Such collusion could be unwittingly provided 7. 
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to a terrorist operation by a person who believes he is involved only in a criminal theft. 
In harder economic times, the incentive for employees to engage in what they perceive 
to be a “black market” will increase.
The fact that a storage or hiding area for the stolen fuel is often already arranged 8. 
suggests that fuel could be stolen and later placed into either an underground facility, a 
fuel tanker, or a surrogate tanker for use in a terrorist operation. 
Law enforcement response to hijackings is a challenge.9. 
HazMat disPosal oPerations  
The transportation of hazardous materials by rail and highway often creates a need for 
special disposal operations. These operations, which involve releasing, burning, or 
containing the material, can provide inspiration and information on how certain materials 
behave and what is needed to release and ignite them for maximum effect. Some of the 
information is publicly available and easily accessible by terrorists.
Disposal operations for flammable liquids focus on cleanup and containment. Liquid 
flammables are generally released and ignited quickly. If they are not, the disposal operation 
involves transferring the liquid from a damaged container to another container. When liquid 
flammables do burn, the fire lasts less than 10 minutes and is extremely intense, generating 
heat of more than 2,000°F. 
 
TIH materials dissipate quickly if the containing structure is compromised. Casualties 
downwind and downhill from a release, under the right conditions, could be significant. But 
once TIH material is vented, there is little to do other than wait for it to dissipate through 
normal pressure and wind. Terrorists would learn little from disposal operations other 
than reconfirmation of the toxicity of the material if it can be directed to a concentrated 
population.
Explosives experts face situations in which truckload explosives have either detonated 
through an accident and caused a blast or have to be isolated and removed from sources 
of further detonation. Explosive materials may remain stable despite an accident, thus 
emphasizing the need for detonation. It should be pointed out that when explosive that is 
contained and intact is exposed to fire, significant explosions can result. The most recent 
accident involving highway transportation of high explosives occurred in Spanish Fork, Utah, 
on August 10, 2005. The truck carrying the explosives caught fire, and the cargo—35,500 
pounds of cast boosters (Penolite)—detonated, creating a crater three stories deep.
Finally, disposal operations for flammable gases, in which carefully managed explosives 
are often used, provide valuable information on how destructive flammable gases can 
be, but also information on how difficult it can be to unleash that force. For terrorists, 
the destructive force would be known from information on rail accidents, which are more 
spectacular, as will be seen. 
A procedure referred to as “vent and burn” has been used successfully more than 15 
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times in the past 20 years to dispose of flammable gases and liquids. It is an emergency 
technique that is used as a last resort to mitigate the danger from containers—such as tank 
cars—involved in an accident. In these situations, the tank car usually has considerable 
damage and cannot be moved or offloaded.
The charges used in a vent-and-burn operation are designed to puncture small holes in the 
tank car in a careful sequence of events, in which the tank is opened, then the material is 
released and safely ignited and burned. When this is successful, a rail tank car of propane 
will burn out quickly in cold weather. Vent and burn techniques have been improved over 
the years. 
The explosive force of the material itself has been seen in unsuccessful operations of this 
kind. After a derailment in Molina, Florida, in 1979, the disposal operation was unsuccessful 
and three rail cars detonated and were blown more than a mile away. In a February 2003 
accident in Lonsdale, Ontario, Canada, five LPG tank cars were involved in a derailment, 
and three of them experienced a BLEVE. While vent-and-burn operations were successful 
on two of the three tank cars, the third operation was not successful and that tank car was 
found a mile from the derailment site.
As indicated, the key technical challenge is that of releasing, venting, and then igniting the 
material, especially at a time and place chosen by the terrorist. The timing and the amount 
and shape of explosive needed to create an explosion—and even more so, vented burns—
are critical and difficult to achieve. If these efforts were directed at creating a large fuel-air 
explosion in a populated area, the fatalities from blast, heat, and damage from rocketing 
pieces of the tanker could be considerable. But there are many technical problems that 
must be overcome with considerable sophistication. This is not therefore considered as 
significant a threat as others.
conclUsion  
  
Terrorists reviewing publicly available material would draw several conclusions. From 
accident data and spectacular accidents, they would see that (a) flammable liquids create 
tremendous fires; (b) flammable gases can create spectacular fireballs and blasts, but timed 
explosions are difficult to achieve; (c) explosives have huge destructive force but are stable 
in the normal transportation environment; and (d) TIH materials such as chlorine—despite 
alarmist media attention—can kill large numbers of people only if effective emergency 
response is not possible. They could also gain inspiration from thefts of tankers, and 
from public knowledge about hazardous materials disposal operations, understand both 
the explosive force of detonating flammable gases and also the difficulty of creating and 
directing such an explosion.
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute Nat ional  Transportat ion Secur i ty Center of  Excel lence
 35
cUrrent state of secUrity regUlation and 
recoMMended Practices
This section examines security regulations and recommendations for highway 
transportation of hazardous materials from the standpoint of the issuing authority, i.e., the 
federal government, and industry associations. It then summarizes all of these regulations 
and recommendations by the phase of security they cover:  personnel, terminal, and en 
route. Finally, it assesses the general adequacy of regulations as recommended and as 
implemented. It does not treat state authorities however, which are significant players in 
the regulatory framework
Background and framework of federal regulation and inspection
Regulatory responsibility for the security of highway transportation is currently shared 
by TSA, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), and PHMSA. In the 
period following 9/11, TSA was new and was concerned primarily with standing up a large 
federal workforce for aviation security. As the agencies responsible for the regulation of 
trucking and hazardous materials, FMCSA and PHMSA issued security rules until TSA 
was appropriately organized and staffed to take on this function, after which any security 
countermeasures issued in response to threat conditions would be issued by TSA. In 
2006, TSA and PHMSA executed a formal memorandum of understanding that delineates 
their agencies’ respective authorities and commits those agencies to coordinating their 
programs and activities in advance under multiyear action plans. 
Inspection and enforcement is also divided between FMCSA and TSA. FMCSA has 
identified approximately 38,000 carriers of hazardous materials of the types and quantities 
that could be used as weapons. Nearly all have been contacted regarding a security 
sensitivity visit. FMCSA conducts about 3,000 compliance reviews of hazardous materials 
carriers annually. A more in-depth program to visit carriers transporting certain explosives, 
radioactive materials, and highly toxic substances is under way. TSA had a workforce of 
100 surface-transportation security inspectors in FY 2007 and plans to increase the number 
to 200 by FY 2010. However, those inspectors are primarily responsible for rail and public 
transit rather than the security of highway transportation of hazardous materials. 
Current security regulations focus on security threat assessments (STAs) for drivers who 
have a hazardous-material endorsement to their commercial driver’s license; operating rules 
for transporting hazardous materials; security plans for companies transporting hazardous 
materials; and safety permits required for carriers of certain hazardous materials.
federal secUrity regUlations 
Security Threat Assessments to Prevent Insider Incidents
Title 49 CFR 1572.3 identifies drivers who hold a commercial driver’s license under 49 
CFR 383 and 384 and are applying to obtain, renew, or transfer a hazardous-materials 
endorsement (HME) to that license. These drivers are subject to an STA conducted in 
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accordance with the standards in CFR 1572.5. Those standards include disqualifying 
criminal offenses described in CFR 1572.103, immigration status requirements described 
in CFR 1572.105, an analysis described in CFR 1572.107 that determines that an applicant 
is a security threat, and a finding of mental incapacity under CFR 1572.109. The detailed 
information the applicant must provide is prescribed in CFR 1572.9. Applicants must 
provide fingerprints for an FBI/CJIS (Criminal Justice Information Services) criminal-history 
records check. TSA conducts the STA through its Transportation Threat and Credentialing 
Office. The finding that an applicant is a security risk is based on an “intelligence-related 
background check.” No state may issue or renew an HME without a TSA determination 
of no security threat and a state must revoke the HME if notified that the individual is a 
security threat. 
Federal Operating Rules for General Security Purposes
Title 49 CFR Part 397 contains the rules for driving and parking when transporting 
hazardous materials. Regulations intended for safety purposes may also be significant 
security countermeasures. 
Section 397.5 requires that vehicles carrying Division 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3 explosives must 
be attended at all times by the driver or a qualified representative of the motor carrier. A 
vehicle is attended when that person is on it or is within 100 feet and has an unobstructed 
view of it. Vehicles carrying explosives are not required to be attended when they are in 
a government-approved safe haven. Vehicles containing other hazardous materials must 
also be attended unless the driver is “performing duties that are incident and necessary to 
[his] duties as the operator.”  A vehicle carrying Division 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3 explosives may not 
be parked within 300 feet of a bridge, tunnel, or place where people congregate, unless 
there is no practicable alternative. Drivers of such vehicles must also be provided with the 
names and phone numbers of persons to be contacted in an emergency.
States must follow CFR 397.61 et seq when establishing and maintaining routing 
designations for nonradioactive hazardous material in quantities that require placarding. 
Routing designations must be provided to the public under CFR 397.73.
Public Law 110-53, the 9/11 Commission Act, provides that the Secretary of Transportation, 
in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall document, assess, and 
analyze routes for transporting radioactive and nonradioactive hazardous materials and 
shall identify criteria for selecting routes based upon safety and security concerns within 
one year.
There is also a general provision in CFR 397.67 stating that even if no state routing 
designations apply, vehicles transporting hazardous materials should not be operated 
over routes that go through or near heavily populated areas, tunnels, etc., unless there 
is no practicable alternative or the driver is required to detour. The driver must be given a 
written route plan if the vehicle is transporting Division 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3 explosives.
FMCSA Safety Permits
FMCSA requires that motor carriers file a Motor Carrier Identification Report and HM 
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Permit Application (Form MCS-150B) per CFR 390.19 to transport either 25 kg (55 lb.) of 
Division 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3 explosives, PIH materials (the quantity varies by hazard zone), or 
compressed or liquefied methane or natural gas in containers larger than 3,500 gallons. 
The motor carrier must certify, among other things, that it has: 
 • A satisfactory security plan per Part 172 of CFR49, cited above
 • A communications plan meeting the periodic contact requirements of Section   
 385.415
 • Successful completion of the security training required by Section 172.804. 
The information required on Form MCS-150B includes a detailed identification of hazardous 
materials carried and the number of vehicles (specifically, hazmat cargo tank trucks and 
trailers) used for this purpose. 
The operational requirements for a hazardous materials permit under Section 385.415 
include a requirement that the motor carrier provide a telephone number to be carried on 
the vehicle that can be used to verify by a motor-carrier employee or representative that 
the shipment “is within the general area for the expected route for the permitted material.” 
PHMSA Security Plan Requirement
Title 49 CFR 172.800 requires that any person transporting more than 25 kg (55 pounds) 
of a Division 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3 explosive or 3,500 gallons or more of bulk hazardous materials 
must have a security plan.
Title 49 CFR 172.802 states that the security plan must include an assessment of security 
risks and appropriate measures to address those risks. At a minimum, the plan must 
contain:
 • Measures to confirm information provided by applicants hired for positions   
 involving access to and handling of hazardous material
 • Measures to address the assessed risk of unauthorized access to hazardous   
 materials or conveyances
 • Measures to address assessed security risks en route from origin to destination.
Title 49 CFR 172.704 (commonly referred to as the HM-232 Security Awareness Program) 
requires that each employee with access to hazmat “receive training that provides 
an awareness of security risks associated with hazardous-materials transportation 
and methods designed to enhance transportation security. The training must include a 
component covering how to recognize and respond to possible security threats.”
federal recoMMended secUrity MeasUres for secUrity Plans
PHMSA and TSA Guidelines
PHMSA has issued regulations and guidelines for developing and implementing security 
plans. On June 26, 2008, TSA issued extensive guidance to implement the PHMSA 
regulations. The measures are indexed to DHS security threat conditions green, blue, 
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yellow, orange, and red, indicating the prevailing threat assessment. TSA, the lead federal 
agency for hazmat security issues, has also instituted a program of corporate security 
reviews (CSRs) (see below for further discussion).25
A training program designed to provide the necessary knowledge and tools to conduct 
an effective security assessment of a motor carrier’s operations was developed as a 
cooperative effort by PHMSA, FMCSA, and TSA. The centerpiece of the program, called 
Hazmat Motor Carrier Security Self Assessment Training, is the “Guide for Developing an 
Effective Security Plan for the Highway Transportation of Hazardous Materials” developed 
by Battelle and TotalSecurity.US for FMCSA. The guide is designed to provide motor carriers 
with sufficient background to understand the threats involving hazardous materials, the 
means to identify the vulnerabilities to those threats, and an approach to addressing those 
vulnerabilities. The guide includes the vulnerability assessment, the components to be 
included in a security plan, the components of a training program, and the administration 
of a security plan. 
  
TSA has also developed the “Hazmat Motor Carrier Security Self-Assessment” for 
managers and another version for drivers. These guides have a question-and-answer 
format, with questions such as: “Do you verify that your drivers meet all state and federal 
commercial drivers licensing requirements, including verifying that they are authorized 
to handle and transport hazardous materials?”  A “yes” answer is followed by security 
reminders; a “no” answer is followed by a complete checklist of security actions needed 
to meet all applicable requirements. A contact list of all concerned federal agencies is 
appended.
According to two TSA reports,26 TSA also conducts CSRs in various modes of 
transportation, including highway infrastructure and freight motor carriers. In 2004, TSA 
began management interviews and site visits to assess security policies and practices of 
organizations that operate critical highway infrastructure such as large bridges and long 
tunnels. By 2006, TSA reported that it had completed CSRs for 38 state governments and 
four other operational authorities. 
Similarly, TSA targeted motor carriers that transport hazardous materials for CSRs. By the 
end of 2006 (the most recently available report), TSA had completed 15 CSRs at motor 
carriers. At that time, TSA did not believe that the “small amount of data gathered lends 
itself to rigorous statistical analysis.”
The CSRs used a framework of 73 standard questions to interview infrastructure operators 
and a modified framework of 76 questions for motor carriers. The questions covered ten 
functional areas:
Threat assessment1. 
Vulnerability assessment2. 
Critical infrastructure3. 
Management and oversight4. 
Personnel security5. 
Training6. 
Secure areas7. 
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Physical security countermeasures8. 
Cyber security9. 
Exercises10. 
The results of the CSRs are considered Security Sensitive Information and are restricted 
on a need-to-know basis. In published reports, TSA uses numerical scores that are not 
“an absolute measure of how well an organization has implemented security practices” for 
comparative purposes.
TSA conducted a pilot program in Missouri that trained 40 state investigators to perform 
CSRs in partnership with FMCSA. TSA is now training compliance inspectors and safety 
auditors in Michigan and Colorado, as well as its own Transportation Security Inspectors 
to perform CSRs.
TSA works with the DHS Infrastructure Protection (IP) office, which is charged with 
coordinating with state and local governments and implementing grant and training 
programs to protect all types of infrastructure. TSA experts have accompanied IP contractors 
on site assist visits to bridges and tunnels. IP’s protective security advisors have in turn 
participated in CSRs.
indUstry recoMMended secUrity MeasUres
American Chemistry Council Motor Carrier Security Guidance
The American Chemistry Council Guide was “solely intended to stimulate thinking,” but it 
is more detailed and specific in its recommendations than any other guidance produced 
for similar purposes. It contains guidance not only for carriers of hazardous materials, but 
also for shippers, to provide complete supply-chain security. It is therefore considered to 
be an exemplar of such industry guidance. The guide was published in 2003 and has been 
superseded by new regulatory requirements in some areas, particularly in driver surety. 
Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME) Guidelines
The recommendations in IME Safety Library Publication 14, Handbook for the Transportation 
and Distribution of Explosives Materials, updated in 2007, do not go beyond federal 
regulatory requirements with respect to any practice that could be considered a security 
countermeasure.
Highway Watch and Successor Programs
The Highway Watch program had four major components:
Training and outreach1. 
A 24/7 call center2. 
The Highway Watch Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC)3. 
The Emergency Warning and Education Center (EWEC)4. 
The Highway Watch program conducted security-awareness training for highway 
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professionals such as truck drivers and infrastructure construction, maintenance, and 
operations personnel. The training provided instruction in how to recognize potential 
security threats, to avoid becoming the target of terrorists, and to accurately and rapidly 
report concerns to the authorities. Training was presented in English and Spanish, both in 
person and electronically. About 800,000 persons have received the training.
The Highway Watch program was replaced by the Trucking Security Program known as 
“Eyes on the Road.”  Subsequently, in September 2008, it evolved to another program 
known as “First Observer.”27   
ISAC shares and analyzes information collected from its members and works collaboratively 
with law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and transportation-industry leaders to 
validate and verify the information and to identify trends, patterns, and potential threats. 
It disseminates its findings to the surface transportation industry and law enforcement.
TSA has also produced a series of foldout brochures on reporting suspicious activities 
and threat indicators. 
sUMMary of reqUired and recoMMended secUrity MeasUres
Security Measures for Vetting Personnel
Drivers must have a valid commercial driver’s license with an HME based upon an STA. 
Other measures to vet personnel are an employment background check; verification of 
citizenship or immigration status, perhaps with a social security number; and criminal 
background checks for employees other than drivers through a private security 
company.                        
Security Measures for Access Control
Facilities should be fenced, with locked gates and doors. Parked vehicles should be locked 
when unattended. Lighting and clear zones around fences and buildings may be combined 
with CCTV, alarm systems, or security guards to spot intruders. A photo ID system should 
also be used to determine if persons are authorized to be in the area.
En Route Security Measures
Each driver’s identity and shipment information should be confirmed before departure. 
Access to information about shipments should be limited to essential personnel. Vehicles 
should be attended in transit, and those transporting explosives or TIH in many states must 
follow designated routes and use designated safe stopping and parking places. These 
routes and stopping or parking places are public information, which may also present 
vulnerability (discussed later). Vehicles should be inspected for tampering with locks 
or seals applied to valves and cargo doors. A co-driver or escort can provide additional 
security. Communications must be maintained with the driver and an alert notification 
must be made if a shipment does not arrive when and where expected. Drivers may be 
provided with a panic-button type of alarm for use in emergency situations. A vehicle 
tracking system is also recommended. 
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Vehicle tracking and disabling systems are discussed in MTI publication 09-04 and are 
briefly referenced again in the “Analysis of the Threat” section of this report. In short, vehicle 
tracking is required for DOD explosives shipments and is recommended—and probably 
increasingly implemented—for commercial TIH and truckload explosives shipments by 
TSA specifically (in its Security Action Items) and also by PHMSA generally. Technologies 
that enable local or remote immobilization of vehicles are being implemented for high-value 
shipments (such as cigarettes), and while neither DOD nor TSA pilot programs include 
immobilization for TIH and explosives shipments, they may do so in the future. 
The situation is significantly different for gasoline and propane tankers. While vehicle 
tracking and some panic alarms have been implemented for economic reason in large 
tanker fleets, they are not used by smaller carriers and are unlikely to be implemented 
soon. More important, there are no indications that the industry is going to implement either 
local or remote immobilization voluntarily, nor are there any federal mandates to do so. 
FMCSA, which as been at the forefront of piloting technologies, has recognized the dual-
use benefits of these technologies for improving operational efficiency as well as improving 
security and reducing cargo theft if they are implemented by motor carriers, including 
gasoline and propane carriers. PHMSA has also issued general recommendations for 
tracking. However, TSA’s recommendations for tracking and immobilization do not apply to 
carriers of flammable liquids and gases. 
Evaluation of Security Measures 
The MTI team applied its regulatory and analytical experience and the results of two May 
2008 site visits in evaluating the adequacy of the general framework of security measures 
and some specific security countermeasures. The evaluation of security countermeasures 
to be implemented is based on their estimated effectiveness, which varies with two key 
factors: (1) the assumptions made regarding the capabilities of an attacker and the plausible 
attack scenarios, and (2) an estimate of the probable level of compliance and diligence in 
Current Security Measures in Brief
Personnel vetting 
TSA	fingerprint-based	security	threat	assessment	for	hazmat	drivers•	
Employment	background	check,	verification	of	citizenship	or	immigration	status	•	
Possible criminal background checks •	
Access control
Fenced facilities •	
Locked gates, doors, and unattended parked vehicles •	
CCTV, alarm systems, or security guards •	
Photo ID system for authorized personnel•	
En Route Security 
Confirm	driver’s	identity	and	shipment	information	•	
Attend vehicles in transit •	
Maintain communications with driver•	
Alert	law	enforcement	if	driver	gives	an	alarm	or	shipment	doesn’t	arrive•	
Panic button or vehicle tracking system, especially for explosives or TIH shipments•	
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implementing the countermeasures.
The assumptions made regarding the capabilities of an attacker and the plausible attack 
scenarios are outlined in the chapter titled “Analysis of the Threat and Potential Attacks” 
beginning on page 47. The operational planning involved for these scenarios is highly 
influenced by the presence or absence of insiders who can provide information or actually 
operate a tank truck. The probable level of compliance and diligence in implementing the 
countermeasures is important, because countermeasures that are deemed effective but 
not actually carried out only create a false sense of security.
Countermeasures are needed for each phase of an attempted attack. Those phases 
and our preliminary evaluation regarding propane and gasoline tankers (where site visits 
helped us) and explosives and TIH carriers are as follows:
gathering information and selecting a target. 1. The large numbers of flammable 
liquid and gas vehicles and facilities make gathering general information about this 
industry relatively easy, but selecting particular vulnerable targets in this haystack can 
be a matter of either opportunity or deliberate effort. A lone operator would be able 
to act only on his own experience, but a target might easily present itself. A local 
cell could take the time and trouble to identify and select particular targets based 
on a broad reconnaissance of its area. Gathering information about shipments of 
explosives and TIH material is more difficult because they are relatively infrequent and 
knowledge of their locations can be more closely controlled, although required routes 
and stopping places are public information. A terrorist acting alone would almost have 
to be an insider. A local cell would probably need an insider as well. STAs for drivers 
and background checks for other personnel provide information and target security by 
limiting inside access to vetted persons. Compliance with TSA- and DMV-administered 
STAs is assured. However, operators will not do background checks unless they 
intend to restrict persons who do not meet their standards, although most will at least 
check employment application references. A sophisticated conspiracy could probably 
persuade or coerce vetted persons to become involved in an operation.
Surveillance and identification of the vehicle(s) to be used in the attack2. . The 
particular vehicle or vehicles to seize are selected on the basis of a combination of 
vehicle condition (loaded or unloaded), location, and vulnerability. Vehicle and facility 
security measures have a direct correlation to the capabilities of a potential attacker. A 
lone operator is likely to be deterred by the mere appearance of security and to seek 
an unprotected target, such as an unattended vehicle. A local cell will look for a more 
vulnerable target to improve its chances of success. A sophisticated conspiracy will 
choose its preferred target and will then work to defeat whatever security measures 
are in place. Facilities and the vehicles at them can be well protected by the measures 
described in this section if those measures are fully implemented and diligently carried 
out. That is reasonably assured for vehicles carrying explosives and TIH materials but 
will vary for those carrying flammable liquids and gases. 
seizing vehicle(s). 3. The countermeasures described in this section are 
designed primarily to prevent surreptitious seizure, not armed hijacking. 
However, the countermeasures would be effective against theft if they are 
diligently implemented. The relative infrequency and high risk of explosive 
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and TIH-material shipments give greater assurance of compliance with those 
measures. A sophisticated conspiracy would be needed to reliably defeat them. 
driving seized vehicle(s) to the target. 4. Once the vehicle has been seized and 
a capable driver is behind the wheel, alert and response are needed to interdict it 
before it reaches its intended target. The relevant countermeasures are effective 
communications with or without a vehicle tracking or disabling system. An insider driver 
with little knowledge could simply drive on to the target without generating an alarm but 
probably could not defeat a tracking or disabling system. A sophisticated conspiracy at 
both ends of the communications link would be needed to override an alarm generated 
by a vehicle tracking and/or disabling system. It would have to involve an inside driver 
with full knowledge of any tracking or disabling system, someone who could mimic a 
normal driver (and even a driver with a legitimate temporary problem) until he reaches 
his target. However, few of the many motor carriers transporting hazardous materials, 
particularly carriers of gasoline and propane, presently utilize disabling systems. 
Igniting flammables, detonating explosives, or releasing TIH materials. 5. Once in 
possession of the vehicle and in proximity to the target, the attacker would have to deal 
with locking mechanisms or breach the compartment directly. 
Key observations from the evaluation of security Measures 
Some of the security measures described in this section were already in place as safety 
measures prior to 9/11. The initial response to the threat of attacks using hazmat transported 
by highway was undertaken by the agencies with safety responsibility for the highway 
mode, FMCSA and PHMSA. In 2002, TSA was still a new agency, and its first priority was 
to federalize and deploy the people and equipment needed for the aviation security system. 
In short, the security measures adopted and recommended by FMCSA and PHMSA were 
common-sense best practices designed to increase security awareness and be reasonably 
implemented in the near term; they were not necessarily derived from a threat analysis.
 
As TSA acquired the headquarters staff to address security in non-aviation modes of 
transportation, it adopted a more analytical approach based on risk management according 
to the consequences of an attack. This philosophy gives priority to those materials that are 
seen as most hazardous to life or the environment or are disruptive to transportation or the 
economy overall. Radioactive materials, high explosives, and TIH hazards are defined as 
more dangerous “Tier I” Highway Security-Sensitive Materials (HSSM); flammable liquids 
and (such as gasoline) and gases (such as propane) are considered less dangerous “Tier 
II” HSSM. TSA has developed a comprehensive set of security action items for HSSM that 
 
Terrorists are not mirror images of our own planning, and we must focus on how terrorists 
operate, not on how we plan.
Terrorists are not bound by the analytical models used by government authorities to mitigate the 
consequences of the expected next attack. They are interested in mounting a successful attack with 
high loss of life by whatever means available. Hazardous materials that are not highly secured, such 
as flammable liquids and gases, are weapons of opportunity and can provide that means.
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were released to the industry on June 26, 2008. However, Tier I HSSM are transported by 
a relatively small and specialized segment of the industry that is much easier to manage 
than the large number of motor carriers transporting flammable liquids and gases, which 
are Tier II HSSM. In short, the strength of the measures appears to be based on worst-
case consequences of sophisticated, high-risk attacks envisioned by the government, not 
on the average consequences of the low-risk attacks terrorists most often attempt. 
TSA was not authorized to have any non-aviation inspectors in the field until after the 2004 
attacks on the trains in Madrid and has been slow to exercise direct regulatory authority 
in non-aviation modes. The institution of CSRs may be a step in the right direction if it is 
aimed at creating better understanding and enforcement of rules, rather than collecting 
data for analysis. 
However, there is still confusion between federal agencies and between federal and state 
authorities about the overall approach to the security of highway-transported hazmat. We 
encountered this confusion about roles and responsibilities in our investigations and field 
visits, finding conflicting statements between state, federal, and industry authorities about 
who inspected the industry for compliance with federal regulations and recommended 
practices. Security regulation and inspection, where it is undertaken at all, appears to be 
an add-on to safety-related activities by personnel who are not specialized for the task. 
This environment has left motor carriers largely on their own initiative to adopt and comply 
with the recommended measures described in this section. In short, security regulation 
and inspection jurisdiction is confused and is also weak. We would hope that TSA will 
address this problem, since it is the lead federal agency.
Terrorists are not bound by the analytical models used by government authorities to mitigate 
the consequences of the expected next attack. They are most interested in mounting a 
successful attack with high loss of life by whatever means available. Many hazardous 
materials that are not Tier I HSSM, such as flammable liquids and gases, might provide the 
means. Security measures must be considered in the context of an actual attack scenario 
and evaluated for their effectiveness against the capabilities of an attacker. We turn to this 
evaluation in the next section.
 
Key Observations on Security Regulations
The security measures adopted and recommended by FMCSA and PHMSA were common-sense 1. 
best practices designed to increase security awareness and be reasonably implemented in the near 
term; they were not necessarily derived from a threat analysis. 
The strength of the measures appears to be based on worst-case consequences of sophisticated, high-2. 
risk attacks envisioned by the government, not on the average consequences of the low-risk attacks 
terrorists most often attempt.
Inspectional jurisdiction is confused, and security inspections are weak.3. 
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analysis of tHe tHreat and Potential 
attacKs
introduction
We have outlined the destructive effects of flammable liquids, flammable gases, explosives, 
and TIH and how these materials are transported and secured. We have also summarized 
the information about these materials that might be available to terrorists, based on reports 
of criminal thefts, accidents, and disposal methods. 
We now analyze in depth how and whether terrorists might use these highway-borne 
hazardous materials to conduct attacks, and how and whether they might use them to 
destroy highway infrastructure, or instead to attempt to destroy other targets. 
To make this determination, we examined targets, materials, operational and technical 
complexities, and terrorist sophistication from different angles. We started with broad 
questions and then drilled down to details. 
This section begins with a review of terrorist objectives, statements, and actions. This 
provides the general context for understanding the likelihood of terrorist attacks on highway 
infrastructure in the United States. We then ask six questions:
First, how do terrorists think about targets? Irrespective of the weapons or materials 
they may have access to, what kind of targets do terrorists find more desirable, and why? 
What have terrorists said? What have they plotted? What have they done?  The answers 
give us some clues about how terrorists may view highway infrastructure as potential 
targets.
Second, assuming terrorists have access to specific hazardous materials, what 
targets might be most attractive?  Here we assume that terrorists have acquired one of 
the four highway-borne hazardous materials that, carried in bulk, can cause the greatest 
loss of life or damage. We then determine which of these materials (without overwhelming 
technical modification) may be best suited for attacking which targets.
Third, what operational considerations influence the selection of material and target? 
These considerations are derived from our understanding of how terrorists actually operate 
and how the materials might have to be altered to be used effectively. They include various 
factors, including how often and how predictably the material is shipped, how well the 
material is protected, and how easy it might be for a terrorist group to understand its 
destructive effects. We then ask whether and what specific technical and operational 
modifications might be needed to increase the chances of creating an explosion or a 
devastating fire. Because the anticipated consequences of the attack—and even more 
important, the probability of success—are important to the terrorists, we have attempted 
to define a narrower set of attacks and materials that might be considered comparatively 
more likely to succeed in meeting the terrorists’ objectives. This allows us to make further 
judgments about the likelihood of hazardous materials actually being used successfully 
against various targets.
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Fourth, how does the sophistication of the terrorist group affect material and target 
selection?  Not all terrorists have the same level of organization, technical sophistication, 
resources, or determination  We subdivide terrorists groups into three categories: lone 
operators; local al Qaeda–inspired cells; and cells centrally funded and supported by al 
Qaeda, that is, organized, funded, and directed with considerable resources and long 
planning horizons. We ask which probable attacks each type of terrorist group might 
be most likely to carry out using hazardous materials (but also taking into account the 
availability of other materials to achieve the same objective). We assess the likelihood that 
hazardous materials might be used by these specific terrorist groups and against which 
targets, which allows us to further refine our conclusions about attacks against various 
targets
Fifth, given the findings from the previous questions, which attacks are terrorist 
groups most likely to conduct using highway-borne hazmat? We provide some 
general observations on how such attacks might be carried out.
This, in turn, will set the stage for some concluding observations about additional 
measures and countermeasure that should be taken to lower the probability of the most 
likely attacks. 
overview of the threat
Before addressing the specific question of how likely terrorists in the United States are to 
employ hazardous materials in attacks against any target, we review what is known about 
terrorist planning in general.
Currently, al Qaeda, its affiliated organizations, and individuals or small groups inspired by 
its ideology, which together comprise the jihadist universe, represent the principal terrorist 
threat in the United States. There are other sources of threat—e.g., white supremacists, 
animal-rights and environmental extremists who have carried out acts of violence—but 
with the exception of white supremacists, they have shown little inclination toward large-
scale violence. Right-wing extremists in the United States have carried out large-scale 
Key Questions in Analyzing Potential Hazmat Attacks
How do terrorists think about targets?  1. 
Assuming terrorists have access to specific hazardous materials, what targets might be 2. 
most attractive?
What operational considerations influence the selection of material and target?  3. 
How does4.  the level of sophistication of the terrorist group affect material and target 
selection?  
W5. hat are the most likely attacks terrorist groups might conduct using highway-borne 
hazmat?  
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operations (e.g., the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing) and have contemplated ambitious 
schemes that would have resulted in large numbers of casualties (e.g., blowing up propane 
tanks near Sacramento in 1999). Nevertheless, our threat assessment focuses on the 
jihadist enterprise, the highest-level terrorist threat.
Based on their own declarations and plots that have been uncovered, it is clear that al 
Qaeda’s central leadership remains committed to spectacular acts of terrorism, acts that 
would come close to or exceed 9/11 in terms of casualties, emotional impact, and economic 
damage.
“Al Qaeda central,” however, is only part of the threat. Since 9/11, terrorists inspired, and in 
some cases assisted by al Qaeda, have carried out numerous lower-level operations, and 
many more small-scale terrorist plots have been uncovered and thwarted. The deadliest of 
these attacks (those in Bali, Madrid, and Mumbai) produced around 200 fatalities each. But 
most of the attacks have produced fewer casualties. Bombings that are directed against 
transportation targets simply because they offer concentrations of people in confined 
environments are giving terrorists a “return” of about 20 fatalities per bomb on the major 
successful attacks, something easily achievable with flammable gas and flammable 
liquids. In other words, we cannot dismiss attacks using certain hazmat because of our 
assumptions about al Qaeda’s ambitions to replicate 9/11-scale attacks. Single operatives 
and local cells operate within a different framework of opportunities and objectives.
In its media campaign, al Qaeda continues to exhort its followers to violence, to take action 
on their own—tacit recognition that al Qaeda cannot provide them with direct assistance. 
Although there have been anecdotal reports of American volunteers being directed toward 
operations abroad rather than in the United States and there is indirect evidence of 
constraints imposed on terrorist “wannabes” by local Muslim communities, radicalization 
and recruitment to violence continue in the United States, and certainly there is no evidence 
that American could-be jihadists are receiving instructions not to carry out attacks in the 
United States. The absence of attacks and the paucity of sophisticated plots, compared 
with the situation in Europe, may reflect good luck and a lack of constituency, rather than 
centrally imposed constraints. 
The few plots uncovered in the United States thus far reveal a low level of capability and 
competence. Therefore, local terrorist planning should be viewed as distinct from the more 
grandiose ambitions of al Qaeda’s central leadership. While surprises are always possible, 
elaborate, multi-component, combined attacks like those in Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Saudi 
Arabia, Morocco, Mumbai, and Madrid are not very likely in the United States.
Terrorists everywhere draw inspiration from various sources, but most of the inspiration 
comes from other terrorist incidents. Repeated modes of attack become part of the terrorist 
playbooks to be replicated locally. For example, the 2004 Madrid commuter train bombings 
inspired the 2005 London subway bombings, which together inspired the 2006 Mumbai train 
bombings. They also draw inspiration from Internet discussions and available instruction. 
Terrorists listen to what we say. Government reports identifying certain vulnerabilities, 
reports that terrorists may be planning certain kinds of attacks, or mere speculation that 
they might do so prompt terrorists to ask themselves whether they could, in fact, do what 
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is being discussed. Our concerns drive their conversations.
Finally, terrorists may draw inspiration from spectacular accidents, reports of criminal 
thefts, or other newsworthy events which, in the post-9/11 world, almost invariably lead 
to official or media speculation on whether terrorists might attempt to repeat them. As our 
review of accidents (“Public Information that Could Inspire and Inform Terrorists” beginning 
on page 25) indicates, there have been a number of spectacular highway accidents. The 
2007 MacArthur Maze crash of a gasoline tanker and the resulting fire destroyed a key 
freeway ramp, but far more deadly highway crashes have happened, crashes involving 
gasoline tankers (Biloxi in 1998, Yonkers in 1997), propane tankers (Spain in 1978, where 
over 200 people were killed at a tourist camp site, and White Plains, New York in 1994), 
and TIH rail tank cars (Graniteville, South Carolina in 2005). A number of criminal thefts 
of fuel oil tankers have occurred since 2006, including multiple thefts of fuel oil tankers in 
Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, and Suffolk County, New Jersey; the 2007 hijacking of a 
fuel tanker in Baltimore; and the May 2008 hijacking of a fuel tanker in Houston. 
The chronology of terrorist plots, threats, and concerns expressed by the authorities shown 
in Table 9 indicates the extent to which plots and attacks have involved gasoline tankers. 
The accounts of these schemes may reflect actual plots that have been uncovered; 
fables spun by captured terrorists to entertain, impress, or mislead their interrogators; the 
fertile imaginations of informants determined to deliver information to eager handlers; or 
hypothetical scenarios conjured up by “red teams” assigned to think as terrorists. But it is 
nonetheless clear that the idea of using hazardous materials as a weapon is by now well 
established in the mind of the public, and almost certainly in the minds of terrorists.
Factors Influencing Weapon Choice
It is important to understand the factors that may drive terrorists away from explosives and 
toward other hazardous materials. Explosives certainly remain the principal weapons of 
contemporary terrorists—bombings comprise the majority of their attacks. But terrorists 
also have used fire as a substitute for explosives or to enhance the effect of their bombs. 
These fires range from simple arson—a tactic favored by environmentalist extremists as 
the easiest way to destroy property—to Molotov cocktails, a substitute for hand grenades, 
to the tiny incendiary devices used by animal-rights fanatics to start fires in retail fur 
departments, to the addition of propane tanks to increase the power of explosives. 
Terrorists on at least one occasion also added toxic chemicals to conventional explosives 
to increase their lethality. Reportedly, those responsible for the 1993 bombing of the World 
Trade Center in New York laced their explosives with cyanide.
Just as large quantities of explosives can be concealed and brought to a variety of targets 
in vehicles, so large quantities of flammable liquids or gases, or of toxic inhalants, can be 
brought to a variety of suitable targets only in highway tankers or surrogate tankers. 
Flammable liquids and gases have also been used as a substitute for explosives, for 
example, in the 2007 terrorist attacks in London. Terrorists filled two vehicles with gasoline 
and propane tanks and parked them near nightclubs in London’s busiest area, hoping to 
create a gigantic explosion and a fireball that, had their devices worked, might have killed 
scores of nighttime revelers. The following day, the same terrorists crashed their gasoline-
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drenched vehicle into the terminal of the Glasgow airport, presumably seeking martyrdom 
in a massive fiery explosion. They did manage to set the car on fire, and the fire engulfed a 
small part of the terminal but caused no explosion—in large measure, because the terrorists 
were unable to achieve the right mixture of fuel and air inside the automobile. This event is 
the closest one we have to one of the scenarios envisioned in this report—an attack using 
a suicide tanker. (It was erroneously reported that the tanker driven by a suicidal terrorist 
into a crowd of tourists in Tunisia, killing 21 at a historic synagogue, was filled with liquefied 
natural gas. The tanker actually contained conventional explosives.)
Following terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia and Morocco in 2003, there were reports 
that known al Qaeda operatives have discussed pre-operational screening and acts of 
intelligence involving fuel stations, fuel lorries, and underground fuel storage locations. 
Authorities went on the alert in both the United Kingdom and the United States.
In another plot uncovered in the United Kingdom, terrorists were considering driving 
limousines filled with flammable gases such as propane into underground garages of 
buildings in London.
A recent review of terrorist chatter about weapons and tactics yields no mention of tankers 
or trucks carrying other hazardous materials as weapons. However, authorities have 
identified highway trailer hijacking as a possible new method of fund-raising by terrorists. 
This conclusion appears to be based upon surmise, and it refers to hijackings of readily 
salable cargos (such as cigarettes), not hazardous materials. 
Nonetheless, as outlined in “Public Information that Could Inspire and Inform Terrorists,” 
tanker thefts resulting from the rising cost of fuel can be viewed as a possible inspiration to 
terrorists, although none of the thefts thus far has had any nexus with terrorism.
From a terrorist perspective, vehicles containing thousands of gallons of flammable liquids 
or gases would seem to offer an attractive target that can be turned into a destructive 
weapon. However, those with detailed knowledge inside the trucking industry apparently 
see little threat. According to our field interviews, they base their view largely on the 
assumption that terrorists would prefer explosives, which they could easily manufacture, 
and the fact that it is not easy to “detonate” a cargo of gasoline. 
Increased government monitoring of large-quantity sales of chemicals that can be used to 
make explosives (e.g., ammonium nitrate fertilizer) and the technical difficulties of detonating 
a large quantity of homemade explosives have created some challenges to bombmaking. 
Less expertise is needed to seize a gasoline tanker, drive it to a target, release the fuel, 
and ignite it to achieve considerable damage. However, significantly greater sophistication 
is needed to achieve a similar level of destruction using propane tankers. 
In addition, ideas for operations may arise from personal experiences of the planners 
themselves—special knowledge, work experience, or access. And given the large number 
of companies, especially independent contractors and private owners involved in the 
carriage of propane and gasoline, the chances of an idea forming and the level of knowledge 
necessary to carry out a successful attack being acquired are increasing. Terrorists are 
opportunists, as mentioned before, and the opportunities are significant, including the 
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opportunities that hijacked gasoline tankers create
The terrorists we are talking about are lethal and destructive. Purely symbolic violence 
does not suffice. They want very high body counts and massive destruction. But they also 
want their attacks to succeed, even if they themselves are willing to die in the attempt—
indeed, they are especially concerned about success in such cases, since they get only 
one try. For religiously inspired terrorists, success is evidence of God’s favor. A yield of 
100 or 200 casualties is evidence enough.
This pushes terrorists toward soft targets, tested tactics, and accessible weapons. 
Availability, ease of access, and knowledge requirements drive terrorist planning. When 
high-consequence results are weighed against certainty of success, certainty of success 
wins. From the standpoint of availability, ease of access, and knowledge requirements, 
flammable materials, such gasoline and, to a lesser extent propane, should be reevaluated 
as possible terrorist weapons for use against soft targets that can yield significant but not 
catastrophic numbers of casualties in the United States.
Key qUestions
1. How do terrorists think about targets?
We can best answer this question by looking at the statements, plots, and attacks carried 
out by (1) all terrorists and (2) jihadists such as al Qaeda. In this analysis, we consider 
the entire spectrum of weapons, not just weaponized hazardous materials transported by 
highway, and the entire spectrum of targets. We establish a general priority of targets for 
Jihadists and for other terrorists. However, we exclude terrorist attacks conducted as part 
of an active insurgency in an area of active operations.
Categories of Targets
While there are probably an infinite number of possible terrorist target categories, the 
history of terrorist attacks suggests that the following may be a useful categorization of 
potential targets in the United States:
Prominent government, political, and financial figures, such as the president and 1. 
vice president, cabinet officers, and prominent CEOs. Over the years, terrorists have 
assassinated the prime minister of Spain and the former prime minister of Italy, and they 
have attempted to assassinate the prime minister of the United Kingdom. Prominent 
business executives have been targets primarily of kidnappings in Europe and Latin 
America; there are no cases of such kidnappings in the United States (although the 
daughter of the prominent Hearst family was kidnapped by domestic terrorists in 
1974).
Government buildings, particularly iconic structures such as the White House, the 2. 
Department of State, the Pentagon, and CIA headquarters. The 1995 Bojinka plot 
included reference to crashing a plane into CIA headquarters, and the U.S. Capitol 
was bombed in 1983. 
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Table 9  Selected Attacks Involving Gasoline Tankers and Official Concerns 
about the threat
January 1982: IRA terrorists ditch a hijacked gasoline tanker under a rail bridge, halting all trains from 
Belfast to Dublin until authorities can determine that the rig is not booby-trapped and can be safely 
removed.
June 1996: Terrorists launch a suicide attack on Khobar Towers, an American military housing site in Saudi 
Arabia, killing 19. The vehicle employed was a tanker truck loaded with explosives, not flammables.
April 2002: A suicide attacker drives a tanker truck into a group of tourists at a synagogue in Djerba, 
Tunisia, killing 21. The tanker was filled with explosives, not flammables; nevertheless, it is often reported 
as a fuel tanker attack.
May 2002: Terrorists in Israel secretly attach a remotely detonated bomb to a gasoline fuel tanker and set 
it off when the truck is at a fuel terminal.
June 2002: The FBI warns that fuel tankers may be used to attack synagogues, although it says that it has 
no evidence of such a plot.
September 2002: Afghan authorities intercept a booby-trapped tanker loaded with jet fuel, preventing it 
from entering the U.S. air base at Bagram.
February 2003: The first of a series of reports of al Qaeda plots to attack gas stations with stolen or 
hijacked tankers appears. The report indicates that terrorists are also targeting bridges.
April 2003: More detailed reports of terrorist plots are released, based upon decoding of captured al 
Qaeda chief operational planner Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s disc drive. Authorities find “evidence of 
several potential al Qaeda plots involving tanker trucks,” including plans for “hijacking fuel tankers on 
the highways, modifying milk carriers to hold gasoline, attaching remote control bombs to unsuspecting 
propane trucks.” Further intelligence indicates that a terrorist operative posed as a potential buyer of a 
gas station in the United States to collect information on tanker routes, fuel delivery schedules, and tank 
filling procedures.
January 2004: Japanese authorities envision hijacked tanker trucks used as bombs in Tokyo.
April 2004: The report of a stolen tanker truck in New Jersey raises concerns about terrorism.
June 2004: Reports of tanker trucks stolen and hijacked in Iraq to be used in truck bombings appear.
August 2004: In a widely publicized report, a captured operative reveals that al Qaeda plotters had 
questioned “whether a hijacked oil tanker truck could serve as an effective weapon.”
June 2005: A report on hazardous materials reveals that a Pakistani ordered out of the country in 1996 
was still driving gasoline tanker trucks for various oil companies eight years later.
August 2005: A report indicates that jihadists were talking about using suicide drivers to drive hijacked 
fuel tankers into gas stations to cause mass casualties. The discussions considered using water trucks 
filled with gasoline. New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles were mentioned specifically as targets. Although 
the discussion parallels earlier revelations, the source in this case is considered to be of questionable 
reliability.
Commercial property, especially financial institutions, and corporate headquarters   The 3. 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) was reconnoitered as a target, along with financial 
institutions in New York and Washington. Corporate headquarters were frequent targets 
of symbolic terrorist bombings in the 1960s and 1970s.
Critical infrastructure, such as nodes of telecommunications, transportation (including 4. 
highways), water, and power. Within transportation, there are categories of targets 
that have been repeatedly attacked (commercial airliners) and more recently attacked 
(mass surface transportation). The airliner has long been a symbol of U.S. sovereignty, 
and flying accidents, from which most people consider no escape possible, have 
always attracted intense public fear and attention. Surface transportation provides 
concentrations of people in situations where it is difficult to protect families. 
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Iconic symbols of the United States, or of a particular region. Internationally recognized 5. 
national icons include the Statue of Liberty in New York; and the Lincoln, Washington, 
and Jefferson Memorials in Washington DC. The financial engine of the United States 
is probably best symbolized in the Wall Street Stock Exchange in New York. So-called 
“sub-iconic symbols,” which represent a city or a region include various other bridges 
or buildings in cities. 
Public gatherings outside of buildings (e.g., open-air celebrations that occur regularly 6. 
throughout the year, but particularly on national holidays).
Large numbers of civilians inside public venues (such as at stadiums during sporting 7. 
events, in crowded shopping malls, in hotel lobbies, in crowded cafes and restaurants, 
or in train stations or airports). These have been the principal targets of al Qaeda since 
9/11.
Large numbers of civilians inside multiunit residential buildings. Residential compounds 8. 
were attacked in Saudi Arabia because they housed large numbers of foreigners.
Al Qaeda and Other Jihadist Groups
The threat posed by al Qaeda and groups associated with it is somewhat easier to analyze 
than that of other groups because al Qaeda’s declarations, plots, and attacks are fairly 
consistent and suggest a distinct prioritization of targets.
Al Qaeda urges its followers to carry out attacks that will produce high body counts and 
will have symbolic value—in jihadist language, attacks on targets that have “emotional” 
value (iconic targets)—and attacks that will cause serious economic damage. The iconic 
component can refer either to the destruction of an internationally recognized icon or to 
an iconic venue. In the latter case, the destruction of the target would not necessarily 
be the goal. The venue would merely be a dramatic backdrop that would increase the 
psychological impact of the attack.
In fact, however, few of the jihadist attacks and plots since 9/11 have included iconic 
targets or venues, although diplomatic facilities and even nightclubs the jihadists consider 
sinful do have symbolic content. And despite the continued drumbeat about economic 
warfare in al Qaeda communications, the economic impact of the terrorist attacks since 
9/11 has been incidental—for example, attacks on hotels do adversely impact tourism. 
Almost all of the jihadist attacks since 9/11 have been directed against soft targets—that is, 
unprotected or lightly protected targets such as hotels (Indonesia, Kenya, Jordan, Egypt, 
Pakistan), restaurants and nightclubs (Indonesia, Morocco, United Kingdom), public 
surface transportation (Spain, United Kingdom, Philippines, India), residential compounds 
(Saudi Arabia), and high-profile individuals. Terrorist attacks on embassies, consulates, 
and commercial buildings (Indonesia, Pakistan, and Turkey) have used vehicle bombs on 
the street; in other words, they have not attempted to penetrate security. Only in a couple 
of instances have terrorists attacked government buildings or, in one case, a refinery 
(Saudi Arabia), which are likely to have higher levels of security. This again suggests a 
low tolerance for risk of failure. The detonation of the terrorist devices, even beyond any 
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security perimeter, still resulted in casualties and destruction. The avoidance of security 
does not mean that the terrorists were averse to personal risk, since many of these were 
suicide attacks. We are talking about operational risks.
A review of the terrorist plots that were uncovered during the same period reveals greater 
operational ambition (use of exotic substances, multipart operations) to attack more diverse 
but still similar targets. Most of the plots involved attacks on public surface transportation—
the killing fields of terrorists bent upon slaughter. Embassies figured in several plots, along 
with other government buildings and military headquarters. Several plots involved attacks 
on naval or civilian vessels, like the attacks on the U.S.S. Cole or the French supertanker 
Limburg. However, soft targets predominate.
Bridges were cited as targets in a few plots, but these plots were uncovered at the “thinking 
about” or reconnaissance stage, before any operational planning. There is no evidence that 
terrorists had or could easily have acquired the means to successfully carry out attacks 
against inherently robust targets in the transportation sector.
On the basis of this analysis and the list of targets we started with, certain priorities 
emerge.
The most valuable targets are those that promise the highest body counts. In addition to 
public transportation, these include outside public assemblies and large numbers of people 
inside residential or public buildings. The terror effects increase if: (1) attacks yield deaths 
that are hard to avoid (hitting the public in areas that were previously thought safe), (2) 
they happen nearly simultaneously in different places, and (3) they can generate horrific 
deaths, for example, trapping and burning people in closed buildings. If such attacks can 
take place against the backdrop of an internationally recognized U.S. icon, their value 
increases even more.
The second-most valuable targets (or at least venues) are national icons. However, the 
value of these targets would increase significantly if attacks also caused both substantial 
numbers of casualties and economic harm. The paradigm for such attacks is, of course, 
the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center.
The third most valuable targets would be key nodes of infrastructure that, if attacked, might 
yield sustained economic harm. These include oil refineries or terminals, port facilities, 
pipelines, and energy facilities. Again, attacks that coincidentally create large numbers of 
casualties are of higher value.
Other Terrorists in the United States
Other sources of terrorist attacks in the United States range from the Animal Liberation 
Front and violent environmental activists to right-wing extremists and white supremacists. 
For these groups, the priority of targets is primarily dictated by the specific objective of 
the attack, because these groups are motivated by narrowly defined issues. While the 
Oklahoma City bombing resulted in a significant number of casualties, it is important to 
realize that in the mind of the bomber, Timothy McVeigh, the objective was to destroy 
a federal government building with government employees, not civilian bystanders. In 
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another case, authorities arrested right-wing extremists who plotted in 1999 to blow up 
huge propane storage tanks in Elk Grove, near Sacramento, California. Had the attack 
been carried out, it could have caused fatalities among nearby residents.28
It is difficult to define precisely the ranking of targets for such a large range of groups. 
However, certain trends do emerge. Declarations, plots, and actions show that these at-
tackers tend to:
Focus on targets (individuals, infrastructure, or buildings) that are specifically associated, 1. 
as part of the government or as part of a company, with the specific policies or entity 
being targeted. Two examples are the bombings of IRS offices and the assaults on 
laboratories or individuals engaged in animal research. 
Focus on controlling economic damage and on limiting collateral casualties. For 2. 
example, recent environmental fires set in housing developments by environmental 
extremists specifically excluded occupied buildings. Attacks on animal testing labs 
have similarly avoided human casualties, although some animal-rights extremists 
have targeted individuals.
Make no mention of transportation infrastructure.3. 
Almost never target bystanders, either in open-air public gatherings or inside residential 4. 
or other public buildings. 
In summary, then, non-jihadist target selection tends to favor acts against individuals, 
symbols of the U.S. government, or a particular policy, project, or practice. It does not tend 
to favor critical infrastructure, including highway infrastructure, and, except in the case 
of right-wing extremists, it does not favor attacks that create large numbers of fatalities. 
In fact, when we look beyond contemporary jihadist terrorists outside the United States, 
we see that bridges have figured as targets in a very small fraction of terrorist attacks on 
surface transportation in recent decades. Moreover, these attacks were against small 
structures, and more important, they occurred in conflict zones where guerrilla armies were 
engaged in sustained systematic campaigns of sabotage to undermine local economies. 
In the more developed countries, serious assaults on bridges and tunnels are generally 
confined to wartime sabotage.
2. Assuming terrorists have access to specific hazardous materials, what targets 
might be most attractive?
In the discussion above, we assumed that planning starts with target selection and 
proceeds to acquiring hazardous materials with which to attack. Another approach would 
be to assume that terrorists have acquired or can easily acquire a specific hazardous 
material and then examine the targets they might select to attack with that material. Here, 
target selection is the driven by the particular hazardous material involved.
We shall attempt to rank or describe the most attractive targets for an individual, cell, or 
group that has acquired or has easy access to one of the following materials:
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A truckload quantity of flammable liquids, such as gasoline1. 
A truckload quantity of a flammable gas, such as propane2. 
A truckload quantity of a Division 1.5 commercial explosive, such as ANFO3. 
A truckload quantity of a TIH material, such as chlorine.4. 
The authors have examined categories of targets and assessed those that are most 
attractive for each hazardous materials, although targets may be opportunistic—that is, 
much depends on what is available within the general vicinity of the hazardous material 
that has been acquired, and the target characteristics itself. Those results are too sensitive 
to be presented in a public report. The one conclusion from this analysis that can be 
conveyed is that there are many more-attractive targets than highway infrastructure that 
could be attacked with these materials, such as office and residential buildings, along with 
shopping malls. 
The discussion following Question 3 (page 58) addresses operational considerations 
that vary by hazardous material and targets. When terrorists have already obtained the 
hazardous materials, the likelihood of success of an attack or the extent of the damage that 
could be caused by it may vary considerably, depending on the target. Also, some targets 
may be vulnerable to specific hazardous materials, but not to others. 
Target vulnerabilities may limit the suitability of a specific hazardous material for attacking 
it. For instance, a flammable liquid such as gasoline is best suited for attacking structures 
susceptible to fire. The ability to get the flammable material to a critical location is also a 
factor. As a general rule, physical structures are most vulnerable to explosives, because 
of the “reach” of these materials and the wide array of structures they could be used to 
attack.
Highway infrastructure would present difficult targets for terrorists, particularly if damage 
to the infrastructure is the only objective of an attack. Destruction of overpasses whose 
steel supports are vulnerable to fire (the type of structure most readily damaged) simply 
would not have the economic effects sought by terrorists, nor would their destruction 
cause significant casualties. Tunnels bored through hard rock might be difficult to collapse 
even with significant quantities of explosive, although their support structures could be 
temporarily compromised. Even if successfully attacked, they may have limited impact due 
to the existence of alternative transportation routes—although tunnels, because they are 
used often as a last resort in transportation planning, may create more economic dislocation 
than the loss of other highway points. 
Only when coupled with the possibility of causing significant numbers of fatalities and 
injuries do these targets really become more attractive. 
The type of highway infrastructure most likely to be a potential target of terrorism is probably 
iconic suspension bridges. Certainly, carefully engineered attacks using explosives could 
pose risks to such bridges. In theory, flammable liquids and flammable gases could damage 
support structure, but the operational complications present significant impediments to an 
attack using these materials. 
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3. How do operational considerations influence material and target 
selection?
Several factors affect the choice of hazardous materials for conducting an attack and 
the targets that might be selected. Accessibility of the hazardous material, vulnerability 
of targets, and a sense of the likelihood of a successful attack are the most important 
operational considerations. These considerations also vary with the sophistication of the 
individual terrorist or group, discussed below. 
Accessibility of the Hazardous Material
One of the most critical considerations in any attack is to the difficulty of obtaining a hazardous 
material capable of causing significant damage to people or structures. Characteristics of 
hazardous-materials transportation play important roles in these considerations, along 
with how well the materials are secured. Key transportation characteristics for the four 
types of hazmat of interest in this study are as follows:      
Flammable liquids1.   . Gasoline is the hazardous material most frequently 
transported in large quantities by truck. They would be relatively easy to observe, 
with points of origin and destination well known:  Gasoline is delivered in public 
venues that have open access and little security. Opportunity exists for insiders 
to acquire truckload quantities of these materials, both as vehicle drivers and as 
operators or employees at the delivery location.
Flammable gases.2.    Although not as accessible as gasoline, propane is still 
an easily identifiable hazardous material whose shipment patterns are 
observable.           
 
Security countermeasures for flammable liquids and gases are the same as those for 
other bulk hazardous materials. If all or most of the recommended countermeasures 
are implemented, a facility will be reasonably secure from intruders. En route security 
depends largely on attending or locking or sealing the vehicle. 
Explosives.3.    Bulk quantities of commercial explosives are delivered by truck 
infrequently, and security can be expected to be higher than security for the other 
hazardous materials considered in this study. Specialized or insider knowledge 
would be almost essential to acquiring these materials for a terrorist attack.  
         
TIH Materials.4.    Highway shipments in bulk quantities of the TIH materials that 
pose the greatest security risks, such as chlorine, are very infrequent. Specialized 
or insider knowledge would be required to acquire and use these weapons. And 
while anhydrous ammonia is frequently shipped, it is a Zone D TIH material, the 
least lethal type, and is of limited value in terrorist scenarios.
Security countermeasures for explosives and TIH materials are similar, and because of 
the high risk posed by shipments of these materials, operator diligence in implementing 
the measures is more assured. Drivers are thoroughly vetted. Facility security for 
explosives operations is generally high. The high level of attention given to TIH materials 
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by authorities and the public is also a factor in compliance. Shipments of explosives or 
TIH materials occur relatively infrequently
As stated earlier, it is also important to remember that terrorists learn from reports of 
accidents and thefts and from some hazardous-materials disposal operations. They can, 
with reasonable effort, learn that flammable liquids (particularly gasoline) are transported 
frequently; that these materials ignite easily, that they can create very intense fires; and 
that they can be hijacked and brought to a large array of targets. 
Terrorists can understand from reports of both rail and highway tanker accidents that 
flammable gas, such as propane, can, under just the right circumstances, explode and 
create a fireball and blast damage that is as great as that from a large amount of explosives, 
with the potential of killing many people if they can be found in high concentrations. But 
they might not understand just how difficult it is to achieve such an effect, especially the 
difficulty of directing energy at a particular piece of a target.
Terrorists would know that explosives are not transported as frequently as flammable liquids 
and flammable gases, and that they are stable during normal transportation conditions. 
However, they would also know that explosives, if detonated, can cause significant 
damage. 
Finally, terrorists might observe that under the right conditions, casualties resulting from 
release of TIH materials can be catastrophic; however, they could also see from accident 
reports that if victims are not placed in precisely the right position, surprisingly little damage 
may occur. They would also rightly infer that most TIH material shipments are by rail car. 
 
Vulnerabilities of Targets
Specific vulnerabilities of specific targets make certain types of hazardous materials better 
suited to attack them and may alter the way a material is used (or whether it can be 
used) in an attack. The effects of target vulnerabilities on operational considerations for the 
hazardous materials considered in this study are discussed below.     
Flammable liquids1.    . Releasing and igniting the contents of a gasoline tanker does 
not pose significant technical difficulties. The ability to position a gasoline tanker 
inside or under a target would be the most critical operational consideration. 
There are many targets with a large number of occupants where this may not 
pose significant difficulties.        
Flammable gases.2.     A flammable gas is far more difficult to release and ignite than 
a flammable liquid. The pressurized gas tanks are more robust and releasing and 
directing the gas requires fairly good timing skills. Even more important creating 
an explosion (especially one that is timed, placed, and well directed) rather than 
simply a fire is very difficult.      
Explosives.3.     Perhaps the greatest operational complexity in the use of bulk 
quantities of commercial explosives would be in knowing how to place a detonator 
and booster charge to detonate a significant portion of the explosives shipment. 
The types of commercial explosives transport vehicles are more varied than the 
types of vehicles for flammable liquids and gases. Thus, more expertise and 
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specialized capabilities are necessary to plan an attack using explosives in 
transportation. In addition, some commercial explosives are shipped as oxidizers 
and must be sensitized before use. Again, specialized knowledge and expertise 
are required. Explosives do have the advantage of being able to affect targets at 
great distances, and a near-instantaneous explosion offers less time to prevent 
or mitigate consequences.  
TIH materials4.    . The only potential targets of TIH materials are people. For an 
attack to be successful, it would be necessary to release the entire contents 
of a bulk highway shipment of TIH material as quickly as possible in close 
proximity to large numbers of people. The robust nature of the packaging acts 
as a deterrent, as does the presence of structures where sheltering is possible. 
A terrorist would also need to be concerned with complex meteorological 
considerations (temperature, wind direction, wind speed) in planning an attack 
using TIH materials. 
Likelihood of a Successful Attack
While most terrorists desire the greatest possible amount of fatalities or 1.   
destruction, a terrorist planning an attack would place a premium on the surety 
of achieving results above a threshold level, rather than achieving maximum 
consequences. Uncertainty of results using the hazardous materials of interest 
in this study is evaluated below.        
Flammable liquids2.   . Hazardous materials such as gasoline offer a relatively easy 
path to achieving an event with at least moderate consequences.    
Flammable gases.3.    Achieving a fire of a certain magnitude is within the capability 
of many terrorists. The ability to produce an explosion might be considered as 
a bonus, though it is very difficult to do. Operational difficulties are much higher 
than those with gasoline for most targets, which reduces the likelihood of a 
successful attack.         
Explosives.4.    Predictability of outcomes from conventional attacks with explosives 
is the standard by which other terrorist events must be evaluated. Terrorists 
attempting to obtain explosives from transportation risk detection, and there are 
steps where things can go wrong; explosives have the potential to produce high 
numbers of fatalities and significant damage to structures.   
TIH materials.5.    Consequences from using this category of materials are the 
most variable or uncertain. Lack of everyday experience with the materials; 
potential difficulties obtaining, opening, and controlling releases from highway 
shipments; and unreliability in obtaining predictable levels of casualties make 
these materials less-than-ideal weapons for terrorists. Maximum possible 
casualties may be very high if everything in an attack goes correctly; however, 
variability is still high, and the median or average for any event is likely to be low 
in comparison with that of other hazardous materials.
It is important to note that potential lack of knowledge about the actual probability of 
success of a terrorist attack plays a complex role in planning such attacks or developing 
strategies to counter them. For example, a terrorist may be drawn to attempting an attack 
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute Nat ional  Transportat ion Secur i ty Center of  Excel lence
Analysis of the Threat and Potential Attacks 59
with a low probability of success based on dramatic but infrequent images of accidental 
hazardous-material events. The difficulties of creating an explosion using propane may 
be countered by the visual effects of spectacular events that have occurred. We may be 
surprised when a successful attack occurs, since both attacker and defender are operating 
with many unknowns and an experience base that is incomplete. 
 
Figure 4 shows a rough correlation of the probability of a successful attack and a reasonable 
upper limit of achievable consequences for the hazardous materials of interest in this study. 
It is based on the study team’s judgment concerning real-world operational constraints 
and history, rather than a worst-case model. It does not consider access and vulnerability 
issues. It was arrived at by consensus, but without using formal techniques or methods. 
Fatalities can be thought of as a reasonable higher-level total (but not worst case) that 
might be expected from a successful attack. Probability can be thought of as the likelihood 
of achieving a successful attack with significant numbers of fatalities, given that an attack 
occurs. Full contours are not shown on the graph in order to simplify understanding (i.e., 
it is possible for each of the materials to obtain “up to” lower numbers of fatalities with 
increasing probability). The purpose of the figure is to provide a general sense of the 
potential risks (consequence and probability) of terrorist attacks using these hazardous 
materials.
estimated correlations of Probability of success of figure 4  
an attack a potential consequences
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute Nat ional  Transportat ion Secur i ty Center of  Excel lence
Analysis of the Threat and Potential Attacks60
 4. How does the sophistication of the terrorist group affect material and 
target selection? 
The ability to obtain hazardous material depends on the terrorist’s available planning and 
funding. Even once the material has been obtained, the terrorist and/or terrorist cell needs 
to have a certain level of sophistication to take down a specific target. Each of the subgroups 
(the lone operator, locally inspired jihadist cells, and groups funded and supported by al 
Qaeda central) has a unique set of operational assumptions that limit its ability to acquire 
material or select targets. Before determining plausible attack scenarios, we need to 
consider the operational assumptions and the capability limits of each subgroup. 
The Lone Operator. The lone operator may be one who turns to a Jihadist ideology 
because of a personal loss or sense of alienation. As they become indoctrinated, lone 
operators may decide to strike at society for perceived personal insults or assaults to 
Islam that are spread through Jihadist literature. Depending on circumstances, a lone 
operator may become the catalyst who starts a local jihadist cell. 
Obviously, a lone operator will have limited funding, because there is no organization to 
bankroll his operation. Lacking an organization, a lone operator may resort to petty crime 
to obtain funds. But this risks greater exposure to law enforcement and possible detection 
and incarceration. Most likely, lone operators will fund their own operations. They thus 
must maintain a low profile that limits their possible attack scenarios.
The level of planning of lone operators will vary, depending on such factors as access 
to information, prior knowledge of intended target sets or hazardous material, access to 
material, and overall mindset, e.g., focus on detail versus impulsive action, determination, 
quickness to act, and temperament. We assume that a lone operator’s level of planning 
detail will be limited due to personnel and resource constraints, so materials and targets 
will be chosen because of the convenience of access. Except for suicide bombers, lone 
operators are inclined not to martyr themselves. 
 
local al qaeda-inspired cells  
The local al Qaeda-inspired cell may consist of first- or second-generation immigrants 
or converts to Islam who are knowledgeable about local customs and culture. They are 
integrated into the society and have the rights and benefits afforded to all of the countries’ 
citizens. Usually, a catalyst organizes the local al Qaeda-inspired cell. Members may be 
usually radicalized through jihadist or Salafi websites, in the prison system, or in radical 
meeting places.
Local cells are connected by ideology and personal ties, not through a hierarchical structure. 
Members gravitate to each other based on that ideology and personal relationships. Some 
of these groups may be amorphous and temporary, but others may establish longer-term 
partnerships in a sustained campaign directed by a central figure.
Due to the nature of local cells, funding is more of a necessity for them than for the 
lone operator. Funding comes from sources such as criminal activity (e.g., the baby-
formula black market, cigarette smuggling, and distribution of counterfeit items) or local 
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sympathizers. Criminal activity increases a cell’s exposure to local law enforcement and 
detection through intelligence-based policing. Foreign intelligence sources are of very little 
value in detecting these cells beyond providing trend analysis of increased local Jihadist 
cells in other countries. 
A local cell’s planning for a possible attack is more in-depth and involved than that of the lone 
operator. Since the cell obviously has more than one member, individuals can be tasked 
with specific assignments, and tailored research can be done. Cell members may also 
be recruited for a specialty they possess. Planning is still at a rudimentary level because: 
(1) local cells cannot take advantage of the resources and knowledge that comes from a 
central and presumably more professional and well-financed authority; (2) the members 
have uneven training, mostly through websites, videos, printed manuals, etc., and very 
little hands-on practical experience; and (3) cell members are from the local community 
and have very little operational experience. 
 
Cells Funded and Supported by al Qaeda Central. Such cells may consist of “foreign” 
Islamists or a mix of foreign Islamists and radicalized local members under the direction 
of the foreign Islamists. At least some members are likely to have received training and 
operational experience in either Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan, or Pakistan. They have hands-
on experience and specialties in explosives, munitions, weapons, etc. Many may have 
been involved in operations against foreign targets, most likely in Bosnia or Iraq.
Al Qaeda centrally funded and supported cells are not dependent on local funding. Money 
is funneled to them from al Qaeda “headquarters,” through the use of hawala29 or an 
informal banking system built on trust. These cells are better financed and therefore freer 
to develop more-sophisticated operations. 
The centrally funded and supported cells are not constrained by time. Operatives can be 
infiltrated into a country through various methods (student visas, border crossings, tourist 
visas, etc.) and can integrate into society, although actual cases suggest that operatives 
tend to hit the ground running. Planning is highly sophisticated, because the objectives of 
these cells are to inflict significant casualties and to hit high-priority targets. They are more 
likely to engage in reconnaissance to maximize the effect of an attack, while minimizing 
their losses. As part of the planning process, they will probe and test security measures 
to find a target’s weaknesses or a softer target. They are constrained not by time but by 
operational success.
The centrally funded and supported cells also possess greater expertise. As noted before, 
their members most likely have practical training and operational experience. Depending 
on the nature of a planned operation, the cell members may be specialists in either the 
type of target or the weapons to be used, or they may go through the training necessary to 
gain access to possible assets. Finally, these cells have more sophisticated knowledge in 
tradecraft, and members are more apt to engage in reconnaissance over a period of time 
to determine routines and routes of prospective targets. 
acquisition of Hazardous Materials
The level of sophistication of a terrorist group or individual is not the only determining 
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factor in hazardous material acquisition. The ease of acquisition of the material plays a 
significant part in the planning process. Another significant factor is the patience of the 
group. If a group does not have an impulsive desire to strike quickly, it may be inclined to 
either recruit a legitimate driver to its cause (to deliver the material to either an operative 
or a target site) or become certified to transport hazardous material. Characteristics of 
hazardous materials transportation play important roles in these considerations. 
Conceivably, a lone operative could obtain any hazardous material except military 
explosives. Frequency of transport and less than adequate security countermeasures 
provide an opportunity for terrorists to obtain flammable liquids. Materials in the other three 
categories could also conceivably be obtained; however, the need for more information 
on movement and on ways to “weaponize,” along with the need for reconnaissance of 
delivery routes, makes obtaining these materials more difficult unless the group has an 
insider as part of the operation. 
 
vehicle acquisition
There are a number of ways to acquire a hazardous material vehicle: stealing/hijacking, 
turning an insider, or through legal means. Groups with limited funding will require more 
drastic and impulsive methods of acquisition, such as stealing/hijacking; as the terrorists’ 
level of sophistication and patience increases, the method of acquisition is more likely to 
be through legal means or through turning an insider to either deliver the vehicle to an 
operative or conduct the operation. 
While hijacking a tanker may be the easiest method of acquiring one, there are others. 
The next possibility is turning an insider. This is more complicated and can range from 
duping an insider into thinking that he is participating in a simple theft to radicalizing one 
who will do what he can for the cause. The insider is a particularly dangerous factor; he or 
she has every reason to keep the operation secret but has no reason to hesitate or not go 
ahead, either because of money (if he has no knowledge of terrorist ties) or subscription 
to a jihadist ideology. The third method of acquisition is through legal means. This is by far 
the most time-consuming method, but it is not overly complicated. The process to become 
a legally certified hazardous-material driver is not difficult or expensive. 
A lone operator may not be able to meet the security thresholds the state and 
federal governments have established for obtaining a CDL which, absent getting a 
hazardous materials endorsement, does not prompt TSA to conduct an STA against 
various databases. A lone operator may or may not have a clean record, which will 
be relevant if he wishes to obtain a legal CDL. Also, a lone operator may be more 
impulsive and may opt for a quick and simple illegal method. Terrorist cells may 
be more inclined to have members obtain a legal CDL license. To circumvent the 
background checks, members who have clean records and have been radicalized 
within the United States will be most likely to go through the CDL certification process. 
 
delivery Methods
Delivery and execution of an operation will vary among terrorist groups, but the success of 
the operation is the most important factor for all three subgroups, and success is measured 
by body count, not by the destruction of infrastructure. 
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A lone operative is most likely to hijack a vehicle and use it on a target of opportunity, such 
as a crowded outside area or a building from which escape is not easy. 
Local cells might use hijacking, coercion of drivers, or legal certification of a driver to 
conduct an operation. However, the attack scenario will vary, depending on the level of 
sophistication of the members. A locally inspired jihadist cell is more likely to create a multi-
event, rather than an attack on a single target of opportunity. 
The level of sophistication of an al Qaeda centrally funded and supported cell reduces 
the need to resort to hijacking; instead, coercion and legal certification of operatives are 
highly probable. Alternatively, the cell might establish a legitimate hazmat carrier company, 
especially a fuel-carrier company, as a front.
5. what are the most likely attacks that terrorist groups might conduct using 
highway-borne hazmat? 
A number of factors go into determining the most likely use of highway-borne hazardous 
materials by terrorists. In the following, we recap some of our previous conclusions and 
apply them.
Terrorists’ primary objective is to achieve a significant number of deaths—A. 
say, 100 or more—with as much certainty as possible. They are not 
inclined to take significant risks in order to achieve thousands of fatalities. 
To the extent that multiple attacks can be conducted, the net effect is greater B. 
than the number of fatalities. Two or three attacks on the same day have 
a greater impact than three attacks separated by many weeks or months. 
The ability to acquire a hazardous material, deliver it, and properly release it C. 
for destructive effect is key. Knowledge and access are important because: 
Patterns of gasoline and propane shipments are often predictable, the 1.   
technical knowledge needed to drive a truck is not extensive and there are many 
experienced truck drivers, procedural and technical security measures need 
improvement, and there is a pattern of non-terrorist criminal thefts of tankers. 
Security measures for explosives and TIH materials are higher 2.   
than those for flammable liquids and gases, and there are plans to 
increase them. These materials are also transported less frequently. 
The ability to achieve hundreds of fatalities at different targets without sig-D. 
nificant technical complication is important. In this respect, we note that:
There are many buildings and other crowded environments, including long 1. 
tunnels, in which truckload explosives could kill hundreds. However, even 
though truckload explosives are the weapon of choice for attacking such 
targets, explosives are transported less frequently and they have more 
security; also, it is becoming more difficult to create homemade explosives.
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There are also many environments in which a gasoline tanker could be used 2. 
to create an intense fire that could result in a high number of casualties, 
including many public or residential buildings, as terrorists have discussed, or 
possibly long tunnels. Public transportation stations, if not properly guarded 
from penetration by vehicle-borne materials, represent another target.
Although spectacular accidents may create the impression that propane tankers 3. 
can create an even larger number of fatalities, the technical sophistication 
required to ignite propane is greater than that which is required to ignite 
gasoline, and even more technical knowledge is needed to cause it to explode. 
When there are numerous unmonitored targets, reconnaissance and planning 4. 
become easier, allowing for the planning of multiple attacks without detection.
Given all of these considerations, we do not believe that terrorists—particularly lone 
operators or local jihadist cells, but even a well-organized al Qaeda operation—would 
use hazardous materials to attempt to destroy highway infrastructure. Those targets that 
can be brought down easily do not have sufficient value to be attractive, and those that do 
have value cannot easily be destroyed with hazardous materials.
Second, there are many targets that are far more likely to achieve terrorist objectives. 
We believe the most likely use of highway-borne hazardous materials by terrorists would 
involve targets other than highway infrastructure. These include, most importantly, public 
and residential buildings, and public assemblies
countermeasures for consideration
There are a number of general countermeasures that should be considered.
General Security Procedures and Technologies. 
State and federal authorities should work together to:
Along with industry associations, 1. increase the required and recommended security 
measures that apply to the gasoline tanker and propane tanker fleets. Clearly, the 
federal government considers gasoline and propane to be “lower-consequence” 
materials. MTI considers them to be higher-probability materials for attacks with 
average, yet lethal, consequences. 
Urgently 2. resolve jurisdictional issues and increase the strength of inspection of 
hazardous materials security measures implemented in the field. It is critical that 
federal or state inspectors ensure that required measures are implemented and that 
recommended measures are understood and encouraged.
Attempt to find ways to encourage the implementation of 3. vehicle tracking and 
immobilization and to apply these technologies to the gasoline and propane tanker 
fleets  (see last section below).
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Encourage the highest possible degree of coordination between the federal and state 4. 
authorities and centers that will be involved in responding to a terrorist threat or actual 
attack involving highway-borne hazmat used against highway infrastructure. There are 
many such authorities and centers, and their power relative to each other will no doubt 
continue to evolve over time. This suggests that state authorities should maintain a 
current understanding of how these authorities and centers would actually respond 
to threats and attacks, by studying them thoroughly and by participating wherever 
possible in exercises to gain this insight. The federal authorities and centers that can 
be involved are many; they include the long-standing FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task 
Force (JTTF) and the newer Fusion Centers; the Federal Inter-Agency Group (FIG); 
the DHS led National Infrastructure Coordination Center (NICC) and the National 
Operations Center (NOC); TSA’s Terrorist Screening Center; and FEMA’s field office 
and command center. 
encourage vehicle tracking and immobilization.  
Finally, we turn to the topic of vehicle tracking and immobilization. In additional research 
provided in MTI report 09-04, we concluded that there is an increasing trend—driven 
primarily by perceived gains in economic efficiency and safety—toward implementing 
vehicle and, more recently, trailer tracking. In addition, efforts are being formed, by 
Qualcomm and MAGTEC, for example, to develop safe and reliable ways to immobilize 
trucks that unauthorized drivers have attempted to start or that hijackers have attempted to 
take over. These techniques include relatively sophisticated and layered levels of required 
authentication, depending on the event. For example, with immobilization and tracking 
technology implemented, even if a vehicle is idling—as it can be if a driver is attending 
the vehicle but not in it—it cannot be driven, and it will essentially experience an engine 
kill if the driver does not input a unique access code. And even if a hijacker is able to drive 
the vehicle, a driver or someone else who observes the hijacking can ask that a tracking 
center remotely disable the vehicle, which is done safely in 12 steps as the vehicle loses 
accelerating power. Apparently driven by the need to prevent theft of high-value cargo, such 
as cigarettes, some motor carriers are deploying this technology, which the most recent 
FMCSA pilot program demonstrated to be safe and developed a set of best practices for. 
Vehicle tracking is also being implemented by some of the larger tanker companies. One 
company, which MTI visited, uses tracking to monitor its fleet and drivers, and the system 
includes a panic alarm. 
However, there seems to be little federal interest or industry incentive to implement vehicle 
tracking and immobilization technologies for gasoline or propane tankers. While PHMSA and 
FMCSA have broadly recommended consideration of these technologies (and FMCSA has 
repeatedly piloted these technologies), TSA—which has the regulatory lead for hazardous 
materials security—has not recommended either tracking or immobilization for gasoline or 
propane tankers. 
The objective of merely protecting a small number of infrastructure targets is highly 
unlikely to justify the cost of mandating fleetwide tracking and remote (as opposed to local) 
immobilization, which would also be technically difficult to implement. However, a number 
of lower-tech procedures can be implemented by state authorities to respond to threats, 
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such as additional guards, CCTV cameras, and even the intentional the use of traffic signals 
to create traffic jams that would make it far more difficult for a truck to reach its target, 
assuming there is some warning. There are very few highway transportation infrastructure 
targets that terrorists would likely attack and this therefore buttresses this conclusion.
However, the possibility of terrorists using gasoline tankers to attack targets other than 
highway infrastructure suggests that tracking and local and remote immobilization could 
have value, particularly when combined with the safety and efficiency benefits these 
technologies would provide for the industry and the state.
Therefore, state authorities, the federal government, and industry associations should 
reexamine the decision to exclude gasoline tankers from tracking, panic alarms, and 
immobilization recommendations, and to find ways to encourage tanker companies to 
implement these technologies. 
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endnotes
1.  We are aware that U.S. Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff 
said on May 29, 2008, that Hezbollah “makes al Qaeda look like a minor league team” 
and “poses the greatest threat to national security.”  However, the United States is not 
actively engaged in combat against Hezbollah, as it is against al Qaeda insurgents in Iraq 
or Taliban/al Qaeda insurgents in Afghanistan; and while elements of Hezbollah have in 
the past attacked American targets elsewhere, there have been no Hezbollah terrorist 
attacks on American soil, nor to our knowledge, has Hezbollah called for such attacks. In 
contrast, al Qaeda, which carried out the 9/11 attacks, continues to exhort its followers to 
carry out attacks on American targets and in the United States. However, operationally it 
makes little difference whether al Qaeda or Hezbollah occupies first place among terrorist 
foes, as both entities have carried out large-scale truck bombings.
2. MC 330, MC 331, MC 306, and DOT 406 refer to tank trucks meeting specifications 
established by DOT for transportation of authorized hazardous materials. MC 330 and MC 
331 tank trucks carry liquefied or pressurized gases. MC 306 and DOT 406 are gasoline 
tank trucks. MC refers to motor carrier designation for trucks manufactured to basic 
specifications issued prior to 1995. 
3. For safety and environmental reasons, some municipalities have moved away from 
chlorine to other, less hazardous or non-hazardous materials and techniques. According to 
a study released in 2007, since 1999, 25 water utilities, particularly those treating wastewater, 
have switched to liquid bleach or ultraviolet light. See Paul Orum, The Terrorist Threat: 
How Water Utilities Can Get Chlorine Off the Rails and Out of American Communities, 
Center for American Progress, April 2007. 
4. “Ton Tank” is a generic hazmat term that refers to portable tanks often transported by 
trucks that carry about a ton of hazardous materials.
5. Wetlines are pipelines underneath a gasoline tank truck through which gasoline flows.
6. See “Public Information that Could Inspire and Inform Terrorists” beginning on page 25 
for a more detailed account of this incident.
7. LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) is a mixture of gases usually derived from fossil fuel 
sources. It is a mixture of propane, butane, and other flammable gases. Propane is a 
product of natural gas processing or refining. Propane shipments constitute the majority of 
highway shipments of flammable gases. 
8. Argonne National Laboratory, Decision and Information Sciences Division, A National 
Risk Analysis for Selected Materials in Transportation, Report #ANL/DIS 01-01, December 
2002. 
9. Although the system records “incidents,” we are calling them “accidents” because one 
of the threshold requirements is carrier damage of at least $85,000, thus highly suggesting 
a single of multivehicle crash or accident.
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10. $85,000 is a conservative figure, since the cost of replacing a gasoline tanker ranges 
from $75,000 to $150,000.
11. We did not include cleanup and response costs because of the reporting focus on 
actual damage to infrastructure. 
12. The incident took place in Delano, California on July 2, 2007, and involved the release 
of 4,789 gallons of organophosphorus, a liquid pesticide. 
13. “Hazardous Materials Accident Summary Report: Overflow of Gasoline and Fire 
at a Service Station-Convenience Store, Biloxi, Mississippi, August 9, 1998,” National 
Transportation Safety Board, NTSB Number HZM-98/02; NTIS Number PB99-917007, 
http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1999/HZM9902.htm, accessed January 6, 2010. 
14. “Highway/Hazardous Materials Accident Summary Report: Collision of Tractor/Cargo 
Tank Semitrailer and Passenger Vehicle and Subsequent Fire, Yonkers, New York, October 
9, 1997,” National Transportation Safety Board, NTSB Number HAR-98/02/SUM; NTIS 
Number PB98-916202, http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1998/HAR9802S.htm, accessed 
January 6, 2010.
15. “Highway Accident Report: Gasoline Truck/AMTRAK Train Collision and Fire in Fort 
Lauderdale, Florida, March 17, 1993,” National Transportation Safety Board, adopted 
February 15, 1994, NTSB Number HAR-94/01, NTIS Number PB94-916201, http://www.
ntsb.gov/publictn/1998/HAR9802S.htm, accessed January 6, 2010.
16. Hazardous Materials Accident Report: Overturn of a Tractor-Semitrailer (Cargo Tank) 
with the Release of Automotive Gasoline and Fire, Carmichael, California, February 13, 
1991,” National Transportation Safety Board, adopted September 4, 1991, NTSB Number 
HZM-91/01, NTIS Number PB91-917004, http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1991/HZM9101.
htm, accessed January 6, 2010.
17. “Highway Accident Report: Union Oil Company of California Tank Truck and Full 
Trailer Overturn and Fire, Alaskan Way Viaduct, Seattle, Washington, December 4, 1975,” 
National Transportation Safety Board, adopted July 28, 1976, NTSB Number HAR-76/07, 
NTIS Number PB-257913/AS, http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1976/HAR7607.htm, accessed 
January 6, 2010.
18. “Highway Accident Report: Propane Truck Collision with Bridge Column and Fire, 
White Plains New York, July 27, 1994,” National Transportation Safety Board, adopted 
November 14, 1995, NTSB Number HAR-95/02, NTIS Number PB95-914034/AS, http://
www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1995/HAR9502.htm, accessed January 6, 2010.
19. “Highway Accident Report: Surticas, S.A., Tank-Semitrailer Overturn, Explosion, and 
Fire Near Eagle Pass, Texas, April 29, 1995,” National Transportation Safety Board, 
adopted May 5, 1976, NTSB Number HAR-76/05, NTIS Number PB-254034/AS, http://
www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1976/HAR7604.htm, accessed January 6, 2010.
20. “Highway Accident Report: Multiple-Vehicle Collision Followed by Propylene Cargo-
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Tank Explosion, New Jersey Turnpike, Exit 8, September 21, 1972,” National Transportation 
Safety Board, adopted October 17, 1973, NTSB Number HAR-73/04, NTIS Number PB-
225032/AS, http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1973/HAR7304.htm, accessed January 6, 2010.
21. “Highway Accident Report: Propane Tractor-Semitrailer Overturn and Fire, U.S. Route 
501, Lynchburg, Virginia, March 9, 1972,” National Transportation Safety Board, adopted 
May 24, 1973, NTSB Number HAR-73/03, NTIS Number PB-221986, http://www.ntsb.gov/
publictn/1973/HAR7303.htm, accessed January 6, 2010.
22. “Highway Accident Report: Automobile-Truck Collision Followed by Fire and Explosion 
of Dynamite Cargo on U.S. Highway 78, Near Waco, Georgia, June 4, 1971,” National 
Transportation Safety Board, adopted September 21, 1972, NTSB Number HAR-72/05, 
NTIS Number PB-213129, http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1972/HAR7205.htm, accessed 
January 6, 2010. 
23. “Highway Accident Report: Transport Company of Texas Tractor-Semitrailer (Tank) 
Collision with Bridge Column and Sudden Dispersal of Anhydrous Ammonia Cargo I-610 at 
Southwest Freeway, Houston, Texas, May 11, 1976,” National Transportation Safety Board, 
adopted April 14, 1977, NTSB Number HAR-77/01, NTIS Number PB-268251, http://www.
ntsb.gov/publictn/1977/HAR7701.htm, accessed January 6, 2010.
24. See http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/analysis_publications/heating_
brochure/heatbro.htm.
25. The TSA guidance can be found at http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/tsnm/highway/
hssm_sai.shtm. 
26. See  “2006 Corporate Security Review Summary: Motor Carrier, Motor Coach, 
and School Bus,” Transportation Security Administration, Washington DC: 2006, and 
“Assessment of Highway Mode Security: Corporate Security Review Results,” Highway 
and Motor Carrier Division, TSA Transportation Sector Network Management Office, 
Washington DC: May 2006, http://www.transportation.org/sites/security/docs/CSR%20
Highway%20Infrastructure%20Results%2011-06%20-%20final.pdf, accessed January 6, 
2010.
27. See TSA web announcement at http:www.firstobserver.com.
28. “2 Men Plead Not Guilty to Gun, Bomb Plot Charges,” Los Angeles Times, December 
21, 1999, p. 3. 
29. Hawala: A system for remitting money, primarily in Islamic societies, in which a financial 
obligation between two parties is settled by transferring it to a third party, as when money 
owed by a debtor to a creditor is paid by a person who owes the debtor money. Hawala 
transactions are usually based on trust and leave no written record. Definition from http://
www.thefreedictionary.com/hawala.
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aBBreviations and acronyMs
ALOHA Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres
ANFO Ammonia Nitrite Fuel Oil
ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
BLEVE Boiling Liquid Expanding-Volume Explosion
CASRAM Chemical Accident Statistical Risk Assessment Model
CCTV Closed Circuit Television
CDL Commercial Drivers License
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CJIS Criminal Justice Information Services
CSR Corporate Security Review
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DMV  Department of Motor Vehicles
DOD Department of Defense
DOT United States Department of Transportation 
EFP Explosively Formed Projectiles
ERG Emergency Response Guidebook
ERPG Emergency Response Planning Guidelines
EWEC Emergency Warning and Education Center
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FHWA Federal Highway Administration
FMCSA Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
FOUO For Official Use Only
FTA Federal Transit Administration
FY Fiscal Year
GPS Global Positioning System
GVWR Gross Vehicle Weight Rating
Hazmat, HM Hazardous Materials
HME Hazardous Materials Endorsement
HMIRS Hazardous Materials Information Reporting System
HMX Cyclotetramethlene-Tetranitramine (An Explosive)
HPAC Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability
IABTI International Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators
IME Institute of Makers of Explosives
IP Infrastructure Protection
IRS Internal Revenue Service
ISAC Information Sharing & Analysis Center
JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force
LC 50 Lethal Concentration 50
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LCV Longer Combination Vehicle
LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas
MC Motor Carrier
MCS Motor Carrier Safety
MG/M3 Milligrams Per Cubic Meter
MTI Mineta Transportation Institute
NICC National Infrastructure Coordination Center
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board
NTSCOE National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
NYSE New York Stock Exchange
OSD-ATL Office of The Secretary of Defense
PETN Pentaerythritol Tetranitrate (Explosive also Known as Pentrite)
PHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
PIH Poison Inhalation Hazard
PPM Parts Per Million
PTDI Professional Truck Driver Institute
RDX Cyclotrimethylenetrinitrammine (an Explosive)
RICO Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
SAIC Science Applications International Corporations
SDDC Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
SSI Sensitive Security Information
STA Security Threat Assessments
TIH Toxic Inhalation Hazard
TNT Trinitrotoluene (an Explosive)
TRB Transportation Research Board
TSA Transportation Security Administration
VBIED Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
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Peer review
San José State University, of the California State University system, and the MTI Board of 
Trustees have agreed upon a peer review process required for all research published by 
MTI. The purpose of the review process is to ensure that the results presented are based 
upon a professionally acceptable research protocol.
Research projects beginning with the approval of a scope of work by the sponsoring entities, 
with in-process reviews by the MTI Research Director and the Research Associated Policy 
Oversight Committee (RAPOC). Review of the draft research product is conducted by the 
Research Committee of the Board of Trustees and may include invited critiques from other 
professionals in the subject field. The review is based on the professional propriety of the 
research methodology. 
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of optimum surface transportation systems. Research areas 
include: transportation security; planning and policy develop-
ment; interrelationships among transportation, land use, and the 
environment; transportation finance; and collaborative labor-
management relations. Certified Research Associates conduct 
the research. Certification requires an advanced degree, gener-
ally a Ph.D., a record of academic publications, and professional 
references. Research projects culminate in a peer-reviewed 
publication, available both in hardcopy and on TransWeb, the 
MTI website (http://transweb.sjsu.edu). 
Education  
The educational goal of the Institute is to provide graduate-level 
education to students seeking a career in the development and 
operation of surface transportation programs. MTI, through San 
José State University, offers an AACSB-accredited Master of Sci-
ence in Transportation Management and a graduate Certificate 
in Transportation Management that serve to prepare the nation’s 
transportation managers for the 21st century. The master’s de-
gree is the highest conferred by the California State University 
system. With the active assistance of the California Department 
of Transportation, MTI delivers its classes over a state-of-
the-art videoconference network throughout the state 
of California and via webcasting beyond, allowing working 
transportation professionals to pursue an advanced degree 
regardless of their location. To meet the needs of employ-
ers seeking a diverse workforce, MTI’s education program 
promotes enrollment to under-represented groups. 
Information and Technology Transfer 
MTI promotes the availability of completed research to 
professional organizations and journals and works to 
integrate the research findings into the graduate education 
program. In addition to publishing the studies, the Institute 
also sponsors symposia to disseminate research results to 
transportation professionals and encourages Research As-
sociates to present their findings at conferences. The World 
in Motion, MTI’s quarterly newsletter, covers innovation 
in the Institute’s research and education programs. MTI’s 
extensive collection of transportation-related publications 
is integrated into San José State University’s world-class 
Martin Luther King, Jr. Library. 
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